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Abstract 
 
The MALRAD activity was intended to provide an exercise activity with 
respect to gamma ray spectrometric response to malevolent situations 
involving radioactive sources.  Such situations can often be characterised 
by high activity sources in difficult contexts where the response is by 
necessity conducted with less than optimal instrumentation. Seven 
scenarios were developed based on previous incidents where possible 
and gamma spectral data and other information was disseminated to 
participants who were given one week to respond to each scenario with as 
much information as possible. In total 14 individual laboratories 
responded. The majority of laboratories were in a position to satisfactorily 
identify sources where single sources were used in situations with no 
complicating factors. For those scenarios involving heavy shielding som 
difficulties were encountered due to distortion of the spectrum from that 
which would normally be viewed as characteristic for the isotope in 
question. Special nuclear materials such as reprocessed enriched uranium 
and weapons grade plutonium provided different challenges and there 
were indications in the reponses from participants of unfamiliarity with 
these materials. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a widening of the range of contexts within which radioactive materials 
may be encountered and a concomitant widening with respect to the types of instrumentation 
being deployed and the kinds of agencies being equipped with such instruments to counter 
radiological malevolent acts. Whether or not the risk of malevolent use of radioactive 
materials has actually heightened over the past decade is a subject of debate but what is more 
certain is that the perception of the risk is higher in certain sectors and has resulted in a wider 
range of instruments being marketed by a greater number of manufacturers and being aimed 
at a more diverse market. Many of these instruments have spectral acquisition capabilities and 
include various functions for the identification of sources. Whereas twenty years ago first 
response personnel may have had access to, at most, simple dose meters, in the current 
climate a range of responders may have access to relatively advanced instrumentation with 
features more akin to those found in laboratory based spectrometers. The rate of this 
expansion in terms of the types of equipment available, the potential situations where it may 
be employed and by whom may be argued to constitute a potential weakness with respect to 
the fact that training of responders in the use of the equipment with which they are being 
provided may not be a priority in all cases. Pressures from various directions often mean that 
the priority is that the responders are seen to be equipped with little attention focused on the 
efficacy with which they can employ the equipment. Such situations engender two 
requirements: the first being naturally enough a focus on training of personnel with respect to 
the equipment they are expected to use and the second being the ability of organisations or 
institutes to provide expert opinion or support with respect to information gathered by such 
first responders. In this context, communication links between responders and centralized 
locations where necessary expertise may be located are becoming the norm. In addition to the 
above, malevolent situations may expose laboratories to sources and materials which would 
not normally be a part of their usual operations. In this context, special nuclear materials 
(SNM) are a significant challenge. Although the interdiction of such materials will ultimately 
involve international organisations and the expertise they can bring to bear, individual 
countries must be in a position to conduct a preilimary analysis of such materials to fulfill 
both their own requirements in terms of response and to be able to make informed decisions 
prior to actually involving external agencies. 
 
The MALRAD exercise was intended to address a number of aspects in relation to the topics 
mentioned above. It was hoped that the exercise would provide a situation whereby 
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participants could practice the analysis of data generated (by themselves or an external team) 
in response to the use or potential use of radiological materials in a malevolent context. The 
nature of such data is different in many ways to that generated in the laboratory on a day to 
day basis and the only way to ensure that organizations/analysts can operate effectively with 
such data is by practice. The equipment with which such data is generated is often such that 
the spectra generated are of lower quality than spectra obtained in the lab and necessitate 
different approaches with respect to analysis. The sources involved in malevolent acts may 
potentially be isotopes with which many analysts are unfamiliar and may be present at 
activities that complicate their identification from gamma spectral information. The contexts 
in which they occur can also be significantly different to laboratory situations and factors such 
as shielding, scattering and distance can all impinge on the analysts ability to correctly 
identify the isotope in question. Where the data has been accrued by non-expert personnel in 
the field, the way in which the spectrum has been obtained may be less than optimal. The 
spectrum may have been counted for too short a period or using a detector type not 
particularly suited for the task to hand. Such factors can impose additional difficulties in using 
the data to generate as much information about the source as possible. Malevolent acts may 
also involve isotopes or mixtures of isotopes that result in analytical signals of such 
complexity that even the use of quality equipment under laboratory conditions is not enough 
to simplify the matter and in cases such as these, the experience of the analyst is paramount in 
performing a correct quantification or identification. 
 
A number of exercises have been held in recent years in the Nordic countries involving the 
measurement of radioactive sources (primarily within the context of “orphan” sources) in the 
field using typical first response instruments. These have included the activities LIVEX and 
DEMOEX held within the context of Barents Rescue. Although such exercises are invaluable 
in providing much needed exercise opportunities in the field, the unavoidable logistics and 
practicalities confer some limitations. These are primarily in relation to the range of isotopes 
being used and the activities present. With respect to the suite of isotopes in use, such exercise 
are typically limited to the sources available within the country – medical, industrial and 
calibration sources of isotopes such as 137Cs, 241Am, 60Co, 192Ir etc. These of course may not 
be fully representative of the suite of isotopes available for malevolent purposes which may 
be sourced outside the country. In addition, a number of sources exist for which exercising in 
the field is all but impossible. The activity of isotopes that may be employed in malevolent 
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situations may also be significantly different to the activities of sources that are amenable to 
the organization and conducting of field exercises.  
 
1.1 Aspects of the Scenarios 
The MALRAD exercise was focused on addressing the aspects of response to malevolent 
situations involving radiological materials that may be difficult or impossible in the field or in 
reality or that present special analytical challenges. The exercise was intended to present 
situations involving contexts, isotopes, activities and instruments of relevance in first reponse 
situations or malevolent scenarios and which would provide an interesting analytical exercise 
for as many of the participants as possible. The majority of the MALRAD scenarios involved 
typical acts of a malicious nature – bombs, intentionally harmful exposures to actual sources, 
spreading of radioactivity without the intent to harm but to make a point or protest and 
sources being involved perhaps unintentionally in criminal acts. Two of the scenarios 
involved the use or smuggling of SNM. Most of the scenarios and the sources featured were 
based either wholly or in part upon scenarios that have occurred earlier and have been 
documented to greater or lesser extent. The bomb scenario has of course not occurred in 
actuality so in this case a real terrorist bomb from earlier was used in combination with a 
plausible source. The smuggling scenarios and sources were based closely on real life events 
involving SNM which have been reported earlier. Whilst these are not strictly first response 
scenarios, it can be argued that a state should be in a position to at least conduct a preliminary 
analysis of sources consisting of SNM and previous incidents have shown that this will 
typically be by gamma spectrometry in the first stages. One scenario involved the use of 
radioactive material in a protest action. While it is unknown if this has occurred previously, 
the willingness of militant groups (be they environmental, animal rights, etc) to engage in 
such actions with other materials (toxic wastes, animal blood, refuse, etc. related to the cause 
being protested), the documented use of the particular material involved in the MALRAD 
scenario in other situations (primarily the harming of an individual using this specific 
material) and the fact that such intermediate or low level materials are perhaps more easily 
obtained than high activity materials (or perceived as more easily obtained), engenders a 
certain plausibility to the scenario and it was therefore included.  
 
All the sources involved could realistically be expected to feature in malevolent acts either by 
virtue of their usefulness in weapons (such as enriched uranium or plutonium), their 
accessibility (medical isotopes, low level materials) or their activity (highly active industrial 
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sources). The detectors involved in MALRAD consisted of the usual first reponse instruments 
based on sodium iodide systems of different sizes and in two instances HPGe detectors. The 
newer CdZnTe type was featured as new instruments coming on the market tend to feature 
detectors of intermediate resolution between HPGe and NaI – such as lanthanum halide type 
detectors. These latter detectors were not included as it was felt that CdZnTe is more 
“intermediate” in terms of resolution than lanthanum halides and would therefore be more of 
challenge, it eliminated the technical challenge of accurately constructing the relatively 
complex background of such detectors due to contaminant activity and it introduced an 
element of unfamiliarity in that CdZnTe detectors are usually employed over a limited energy 
range. CdZnTe detectors also tend to feature prominently in the the more compact 
“radioisotope identifier” types of instrument marketed to first response agencies. Full and 
complete information about detectors employed for each scenario are included in the 
descriptions of each scenario. 
 
1.2 Scenario Information 
For each scenario, sources and activities employed were based on typical industrial/medical 
sources in common use, amounts of material that have been involved in previous incidents or 
estimates of amounts that could be considered reasonable within the context of the presented 
scenarios. Information as to nuclear data (energies, probabilities etc) were retrieved from the 
online Table of Isotopes hosted on the website at Swedens Lund University 
(http://nucleardata.nuclear.lu.se/nucleardata/toi/welcome.stm) as it was assumed that this was 
reasonably accessible to most participants. Dose calculations were conducted using 
MicroShine® and MicroShield® from Grove Software Inc. as well as RadPro (McGinnis, 
2008).  Calculations of ingrowth and decay were based upon the US DOE’s Radiological 
Toolbox (Eckerman and Sjoreen, 2006). Spectra were simulated according to the codes of 
Hensley et al (2005) and Plenteda (2002), via manual modification of actual spectra or by the 
addition of actual and synthetic spectra. Spectral conversions were conducted using either 
home made routines or SPECON 2000  (Hong, 2001).  An arbitrary discrimination level of 30 
keV was applied to most scenarios as this was deemed realistic for the detectors concerned 
and avoided unnecessary calculations at the lower energy end of the spectra. Although 
scattering is a problem in making gamma measurements of the type represented in some of 
the MALRAD scenarios, simulation is a problem due to extreme calculation times. In an 
attempt to avoid this, detectors were “collimated” although in one case an attempt was made 
to include a scattering contribution by recording an actual spectrum and then removing the 
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gamma photopeaks from it. The synthetic spectrum was then superimposed on the scatter 
contribution and the two spectra merged. Backgrounds were not added in most cases as it was 
felt that the contribution of background in most cases given coun ttimes and activities would 
have been minimal. Where they were added, real background spectra were added to the 
simulated spectrum. Effects due to beta and neutrons (including activation products in 
shielding materials) were not included in the simulation for convenience purposes. The 
MALRAD activity itself was conducted in two phases – the first being distribution of a 
practice scenario and the second being the distribution of the 7 exercise scenarios. 
 
1.3 Practice Scenario 
Approximately two weeks before the activity proper, a practice scenario in the exact same 
format as the test scenarios was sent to participants. This consisted of a trivial case utilizing a 
point source NaI spectrum of 1 MBq of 226Ra + daughters. The main purpose of this scenario 
was to test procedures and ensure that all participants could handle the material with their 
systems. 
 
 
2. The Scenarios 
The following section provides an overview and technical details as to the 7 MALRAD 
scenarios. Indepth spectral details may be found in the relevant appendices. Suggested 
solutions to the Scenarios are provided only as examples using minimal software resources 
and time and are not intended as “model” or correct solutions .  
 
 
2.1 Scenario 1 
The objective of scenario 1 was the simulation of data generated in response to a hypothetical 
radiological dispersion device (RDD). Although there are essentially no documented 
examples of such an event, the potential consequences and the attention they receive 
warranted its inclusion. The source for scenario 1 was assumed to have been an RDD 
employing a 370 GBq (10 Ci) 241Am/Be well logger that was 10 years old. Based on an initial 
activity of 370 GBq and an age of 10 years, the activities of the source and its daughters were 
calculated to be as displayed in Table I. 
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Isotope Initial activity (GBq) Activity after 10 years (GBq) 
Am-241 370 3.64117E+02 
Np-237 0 1.18881E-03 
Pa-233 0 1.17623E-03 
U-233 0 2.55966E-08 
Th-229 0 7.98090E-12 
Ra-225 0 7.84030E-12 
Ac-225 0 7.74780E-12 
Fr-221 0 7.74780E-12 
At-217 0 7.74780E-12 
Bi-213 0 7.74780E-12 
Po-213 0 7.58130E-12 
Tl-209 0 1.67351E-13 
Pb-209 0 7.74780E-12 
Table I. Decay of parent and ingrowth of daughters over 10 years for Scenario 1. Shaded 
isotopes are those included in the simulation. 
 
Given that inappreciable amounts of daughters would be present below 233U for the time 
period, the simulation was only conducted for this isotope and the preceding parents. For the 
purpose of the exercise, it was assumed that the logger had been dismantled entirely and the 
source had been fully exposed and was present in a dispersible form of small volume. The 
distance between the detector and the source and the small size of the latter facilitated its 
handling as an effective point source. The bomb type chosen for the scenario was that of the 
London Docklands bombing of 1996 given that it was large and details are available.  The 
source was assumed to have been placed centrally within a mass of 500 kg of a standard 
ammonium fertilizer/fuel oil blasting mixture (ANFO) as is typically found in homemade 
explosives or as is purloined from quarries etc. For the shielding calculations the mixture was 
assumed to primarily have the chemical composition NH4NO3 (5% H, 35% N , 60% O w/w 
nominal) which has a density of 1.725 g/cm3 but a density of 0.84 g/cm3 when mixed with the 
appropriate amount of fuel oil. This matrix was in a container of volume 0.595 m3 in the 
geometric form of a cube of side length 84 cm which was assumed to have a negligble 
contribution to shielding (paper or cardboard). This was then further assumed to have been 
covered in a lead sheet (standard “lead blanket”) of uniform thickness 2 mm and placed 
centrally in the back of a truck whose construction on the side for measurement was to be 1 
mm of iron. The width of the truck was 2 m and the detector was then positioned normal and 
central to one side of the cube and at a distance of 1.0 m from the source itself, in effect up 
against the side of the truck. The problem reduced to that of a point source with shielding 
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between it and the detector. The effective shielding was that of 2 mm lead plus 1 mm of iron 
in addition to the shielding provided by 43 cm of the hydrogen rich explosive. Self attenuation 
within the “point” source itself was neglected. The neutrons that may have been expected to 
emanate from the well logger were not simulated although it is plausible that such neutrons 
would not have been detectable outside of the truck given the hydrogen rich nature of the 
bomb materials. On the other hand it is also plausible that there would be some induced 
activity due to the neutrons which would have resulted in a gamma signal but this was 
neglected based on the assumption that that activity would have been negligible relative to the 
source activity. 
 
Two dose measurements were provided, one calculated for the same position at which the 
spectrum was taken and the second measurement one meter further back along the same axis. 
The background dose in the area was stated as 0.11 μSv/hr. The dose rate at position one (side 
of the truck) was stated as being 0.5 μSv/hr and at position 2 (1 m away from the side of the 
truck)  0.21 μSv/hr.  
 
The simulated detector was a standard 3 x 3 inch NaI detector with an aluminium frontcap of 
0.5 mm thickness being 4 mm from the crystal face. The nominal resolution was 6.9% at 662 
keV. The spectrum was counted over 1024 channels covering the energy range 10 to 2600 
keV. The count was for a live time of 600 seconds. The participants were informed that the 
detector was collimated such that scattering effects could be expected to be lessened with 
respect to the spectrum. Random statistical noise was added to the spectrum after simulation. 
A simulated background signal was also added to the spectrum, the primary effect of this 
being the appearance of a slight 40K peak at 1460 keV. A point source spectrum was also 
provided as a means of calibrating for shape and energy. This consisted of a weak source (less 
than 1 kBq each) of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 60Co and 88Y held at 10 cm from the detector face 
and accrued for a period sufficient to give good statistics. For follow up, the participants were 
provided with the above two spectra on an 8k HPGe detector over the same energy range 
counted for the same time and in the presence of the same absorbers.  
 
The primary potential problems with the spectrum as provided were the activity of the source 
and the thick shielding between source and detector. Although 241Am has a range of gamma 
rays, the vast majority of commercially provided libraries include just the one primary line at 
59.5 keV although some specialised libraries within such packages outline the full suite. 
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Normally this low energy line will dominate the spectrum of 241Am but in this situation, the 
shielding present served to reduce the significance of this line in the spectrum and allow other 
normally less significant lines to dominate (see Figure 1). In particular, 241Am possesses a 
range of weak lines in the 200 to 400 keV and the 600 to 800 keV region, one of which has 
the potential for being easily mistaken for the 661 keV line of 137Cs. In a “normal” situation 
the spectrum would be even more difficult due to scattered radiation and the presence of a 
collimated detector was used in the scenario to attempt to “remove” this complication. In real 
circumstances without collimation it is most probable that the small 59.5 keV peak would not 
be evident at all or only found with difficulty due to a much higher low energy signal from 
scattering. The identification of the spectrum as 241Am would obviously depend upon the 
analysts/softwares ability to locate the 59.5 keV line. Perhaps the worst case situation in this 
scenario would be failure to identify the 241Am source with misidentification of the source as 
137Cs or some other isotope. Alternatively a situation could be envisaged whereby 241Am was 
identified and where a number of potential false positives would also be deemed present.  
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Figure 1. Graph of calculated transmission against photon energy for Scenario 1 and the two 
participant shielding estimates. 
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Figure 2. Correct location and identification of major constituent peaks in the spectrum of 
Scenario 1 using commercial software. 
 
The dose data provided consisted of the results of two measurements, the first being at the 
point where the spectrum was taken and the second 1 m back. The corrected dose rates for 
these two positions were 0.39 and 0.1 µSv/hr. Using the relationships: 
 
1
2
22
1 D
rDr ⋅=             Γ
×=
2
1rDA  
where 
A = source activity in GBq  
D = background corrected doserate measured at distance r1 from source 
r1 = distance in meters to source 
Γ  = Gammaconstant (mSv/h) pr GBq at 1 m distance for the isotope. 
would provide a measure of the distance between the first measurement point and the source 
of approximately 0.5 m and two activity estimates of 1.3 GBq and 3.0 GBq both estimates 
being significantly lower than the reality due to the shielding present. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the spectral region between 10 and 1000 keV for NaI (black line) 
and HPGe (red line) for the 241Am source of Scenario 1 (spectra adjusted vertically for 
comparison purposes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4. Comparison of NaI spectra for the unshielded 241Am source and the shielded 
source under the same conditions. Note that the 59 keV peak is truncated in the unshielded 
spectrum due to an overflow in the simulation. 
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2.1.1. Reported Results 
Participant Reported Data 
1 Source not clearly identified from spectrum.  However, 
239Pu could be a possible 
candidate.  239Pu amount estimated from dose rate measurements at 50 MBq or 0.02 g. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 
241Am (small peak at 60 keV, probably due to shielding of side of car) and possibly 
152Eu, 239Pu, 137Cs and 40K (background) 
5 Unidentified source 
6 No data reported 
7 
The source is not identified. There is no data in available database on radionuclides 
with the gamma-lines at energies of (205±5) keV, (328±5) keV, (370±5) keV, (660±5) 
keV, and (720±5) keV. The mixture of 137Cs with other unknown radionuclide (-s) 
might be suspected.  The malfunction of the device during measuring the spectrum is 
not considered in this report. However, similarity of the shape in the both energy 
regions of (270-420) keV and (580-780) keV can raise the questions about change in 
signal gain during the acquisition. The possible candidate for the source might be 
commonly considered either beta- or alpha-emitter with very low gamma-ray emission 
probabilities.  
8 
The spectrum suggests a 241Am source. Since the 59-kev line is weak the source is  
partly shielded. If we had enough time we could analyse the ratios of the various peaks 
to decide the shielding, but we guess a few mm of lead.  The two dose rate readings 
suggest that the source is in the centre of the truck and this combined with the 
shielding suggests that the source has strength of about 140 GBq assuming it’s a point 
source. 
9 Maybe plutonium containing mixture 
10 Very high activities of heavily shielded 241Am. 
11 241Am, 40 GBq,  Shielded source 
12 
Most important nuclide in the source is 137Cs, and we also think it consists of 241Am 
and a small amount of 131I. The most problematic is the peak around 330 keV, but we 
have decided on 51Cr, though the 320 keV peak of that nuclide is far apart. The dose 
measurements suggest activity in the order of 1 – 2 MBq of 137Cs. 
13 137Cs (1.23 MBq), 131I (suspected), 241Am (suspected) 
14 
Identified as 241Am. The source is heavily shielded, roughly equivalent to 1.5 cm of 
steel.The activity is estimated (assuming the aforementioned shielding) to be 
approximately 200-300 MBq. 
15 No data reported 
16 
The spectrum contains 137Cs and possibly a small amount of 241Am. There are also 
peaks at about 212 (228Ac background?), 336 and 369 keV but they have not been 
identified. 
17 Unidentified 
18 This is obviously a heavily shielded 241Am source.   
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2.1.2. Discussion 
Responses from participants reflect the difficulty in identifying sources behind heavy 
shielding where their characteristic spectrum is distorted due to differing transmission across 
the energy range. A significant number however recognised the presence of 241Am although 
the effect of the dominance of usually insignificant lines (such as that at 660 keV) is apparent 
in the number who indicate the presence of 137Cs and other isotopes. A number of the 
participants correctly identified the presence of shielding and it was interesting to note that at 
least one was in position to estimate the thickness of the shielding present and a second 
indicated an ability to do so. Activity estimates were in all cases well below the actual amount 
present although this was expected and it is most probable that in an emergency situation, 
identification of the isotope plus recognition of shielding would result in an ultimate response 
little different to that which would have occurred had the exact activity been known. 
Misidentification of the isotope is possibly a little more consequential in that it must be 
assumed that the consequences of dispersal of an alpha emitter like 241Am in an RDD would 
be potentially more problematic than dispersion of a gamma emitter such as 137Cs (with 
similar problems in cases where 131I was identified). One participant demonstrated the 
problem of there being no corresponding entries in the employed library despite having 
correctly identfied the peaks present resulting ultimately in a failure to identify although the 
analyst was able to hypothesise as to its possible nature (alpha emitter). Scenario 1 aptly 
served to demonstrate that an ability to identify an isotope in a field situation can be 
compromised due to the context in which the isotope is presented and the activity that may be 
present.  
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2.2 Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 was intended to simulate an incident involving the siezure of an amount of 
weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). A number of incidents have been reported over the years 
involving varying quantities of such materials in a range of situations with perhaps the best 
known being the interdiction of several hundred grams of 6Li and over half a kilo of mixed 
oxides of plutonium and uranium at Munich airport in 1994 (IAEA Database on Illicit 
Trafficing, and see Wallenius et al, 2007). Of this some 408 g was plutonium oxide of which 
87% was fissile 239Pu of 99.75% purity. Although the seizure of such materials would 
ultimately require or involve international assistance/authorities, it can be argued that any 
individual country should be in a position to conduct at least a preliminary analysis of the 
material for identification purposes and in that respect it was included in the MALRAD suite 
of scenarios.  
 
The source for this scenario was considered to be exactly 100 g of of 25 year old (since last 
separation) WGPuO, sealed in a steel cylinder for the puposes of safe smuggling. The PuO 
volume was 8.69 cc (assumed density 11.5) and was, for the purpose of the simulation, in the 
geometric form of a perfect cylinder of dimensions 2 cm in diameter and 2.77 cm in height. 
This was then sealed in a steel cylinder of wall thickness 1 cm, external diameter 4 cm, and 
external height 5 cm. The PuO was presumed to consist of the following weight composition 
at the time of purification, this being typical for WGPu (Fetter et al, 1990).  
 
238Pu 0.005% (0.005 g) 
239Pu 93.3% (93.3 g) 
240Pu 6.0% (6 g) 
241Pu 0.4% (0.4 g) 
242Pu 0.015%  (0.015 g) 
 
The Pu source was then allowed to “decay” for 25 years to simulate Pu that was stolen from a 
respository for such materials or similar and daughters built up over that time were  included 
if they had an activity of more than 10 Bq (see Table II). Non-Pu impurities in the initial 
source were assumed to be less than 0.3%. For the purposes of the scenario, the following 
specific activities were used: 238Pu – 6.3E+14 Bq/kg, 239Pu – 2.3E+12 Bq/kg, 240Pu – 8.4E+12 
Bq/kg, 241Pu – 3.8E+15 Bq/kg, 242Pu – 1.5E+11 Bq/kg. Based on the above, the following was 
assumed to be present after 25 years decay. 
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 Bq  Bq  Bq  Bq  Bq 
238Pu 2.585E+09 239Pu 2.144E+11 240Pu 5.027E+10 241Pu 4.563E+11 242Pu 2.25E+06 
234U 2.030E+05 235U 5.281E+03 236U 3.727E+04 241Am 3.463E+10 238U 8.72E-03 
230Th 2.360E+01 231Th 5.279E+03 232Th 2.308E-05 237U 1.119E+07 234Th 8.69E-03 
226Ra 8.631E-02 231Pa 1.394E+00 228Ra 1.259E-05 237Np 1.693E+05 234mPa 8.67E-03 
222Rn 8.615E-02 227Ac 3.062E-01 228Ac 1.259E-05 233Pa 1.681E+05 234Pa 2.86E-05 
218Po 8.615E-02 227Th 2.996E-01 228Th 9.631E-06 233U 6.712E+00 234U 3.07E-07 
214Pb 8.615E-02 223Fr 4.225E-03 224Ra 9.616E-06 229Th 4.168E-03 230Th 2.30E-11 
218At 1.723E-05 223Ra 3.021E-01 220Rn 9.616E-06 225Ra 4.131E-03 226Ra 5.70E-14 
214Bi 8.615E-02 219Rn 3.021E-01 216Po 9.616E-06 225Ac 4.105E-03 222Rn 1.25E-13 
214Po 8.615E-02 215Po 3.021E-01 212Pb 9.616E-06 221Fr 4.105E-03 218Po 1.33E-15 
210Pb 1.456E-02 211Pb 3.021E-01 212Bi 9.616E-06 217At 4.105E-03 214Pb 0.00E+00 
210Bi 1.452E-02 211Bi 3.021E-01 212Po 6.159E-06 213Bi 4.105E-03 218At 1.30E-17 
210Po 1.338E-02 207Tl 3.013E-01 208Tl 3.455E-06 213Po 4.017E-03 214Bi 1.09E-13 
  211Po 8.461E-04   209Tl 8.869E-05 214Po 2.31E-13 
      209Pb 4.105E-03 210Pb 1.06E-13 
        210Bi 5.91E-14 
        210Po 9.65E-14 
 
Table II. Isotopes and activities based on 25 years decay and ingrowth of the 100 g of 
WGPuO for Scenario 2. Shaded isotopes with activities above 10 Bq were used in the 
simulation. 
 
For the purposes of Scenario 2, it was supposed that the steel cylinder was counted suspended 
normally and coaxially over a HPGe detector as a preliminary step in its analysis and it was 
the result of this analysis which formed the basis for the scenario materials. The distance 
between the endcap of the detector and the bottom of the cylinder was 15 cm which would be 
a typical distance for measurements of this type. Self absorption by the PuO matrix was 
included in the simulation as was the 1 cm of steel shielding due to the cylinder itself. The 
detector was a standard coaxial HPGe detector with an  aluminium endcap, dead layer of 0.5 
mm, relative efficiency of 50% and a resolution of 1.9 keV at 1332 keV. The spectrum was 
between 10 keV and 2000 keV with a discrimation of 30 keV and 8192 channels (0.24292 
keV/channel). The live time was 3600 seconds. No efficiency data was provided to the 
participants. Such a situation, due to lack of information of the geometry, would of course not 
facilitate generation of accurate efficiency values by any means. A point source spectrum was 
also provided containing 241Am, 60Co, 88Y, 109Cd and 137Cs for the purpose of energy and 
shape calibration. 
 
The analysis of Pu on a coaxial HPGe detector presents significant challenges for the analyst. 
These are related primarily to the complex nature of the spectrum, its domination by 241Am in 
“old” samples,  its being a material not often (if ever by most labs) encountered and the fact 
that most commercial software include, at best, a rudimentary library related to Pu. A 
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“normal” HPGe detector was chosen as it was considered that not all laboratories are in 
possession of the planar detectors on which such an analysis would be best performed. In 
general it was considered reasonable to hope that participants could: 
 
• identify the source as being plutonium,  
• could estimate whether or not the plutonium was weapons grade (“low burnup”) or 
reactor grade (“high burnup”) plutonium and;  
• theoretically, estimate the age of the material since last separation. 
 
The identification of significant amounts of old plutonium by HPGe gamma ray spectrometry 
is theoretically a relatively simple task given that the isotopes it is typically composed of emit 
a number of gamma rays but in practice the situation is complicated by the level of 
complexity of the spectrum. The most prominent signature in the spectrum is usually that of 
241Am at 59.5 keV which was clearly visible in the Scenario 2 spectrum even allowing for the 
1 cm of steel shielding and the distance to the detector which served to attenuate this peak. In 
this context, the presence of 241Am should have served as a strong indicator for the potential 
presence of the parent 241Pu. The presence of the clearly defined strong singlet peak at 345.0 
keV should also serve as indication of the presence of 239Pu which would then allow 
confirmation of the presence of this isotope using a number of other lines, in particular, the 
646 keV and 659 keV singlets.  On this basis, identification of 239Pu and 241Pu based on 241Am 
(in addition to 237U) should have been relatively straightforward. Once 239Pu was identified, it 
is quite reasonable to assume the presence of 238Pu and 240Pu.  
 
Pu-241 has a limited number of gamma lines and the ones it does have are in the most 
complex (abd difficult) area of the spectrum at less than 100 keV. Identification is therefore 
facilitated mostly via the emissions of 241Am and 237U. Pu-242 is essentially impossible to 
identify using normal gamma ray spectrometry tools as it has only three lines of low energy 
which would have been both drowned out by 241Am and heavily attenuated by the steel 
cladding. Pu-240 has some potentially useful lines such as those at 104.2 keV, 160.3 keV and 
642.3 keV but these tend to be part of complex multiplets and it is ulikely that they would be 
found by an automatic search or identified as the correct isotope by the software. If the 
presence of 239Pu had been determined however then a specific manual search for these lines 
would probably have confirmed the presence of this isotope which should, at any rate, have 
been assumed given the presence of 239Pu. On this basis, identification of the material as 
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plutonium of one form or another should have been a relatively simple matter and a definitive 
identification should have been possible with a careful analysis of the spectrum. 
 
One weakness of the MALRAD scenario was that the sample was simulated as PuO but did 
not feature the characteristic peak at 870.8 keV that has frequently been proposed for 
distinguishing PuO from metallic Pu. Although this peak has gained apparent acceptance as 
an identifier of PuO, the source of the peak and its being an identifier for the oxide state is a 
matter of some discussion (see Peurrung et al, 2001) and due to lack of information as to 
intensities etc, the decision was made not to include the peak.  
 
Determining whether or not the plutonium present was high burnup or low burnup presents a 
more complex challenge as it involves assessing the 240Pu/239Pu relationship (low for low 
burnup or “weapons grade”, high for high burnup or “reactor grade”). The accurate 
assessment of isotopic ratios in plutonium samples is a complicated task and this fact has 
resulted in the development of range of software packages and routines for conducting such 
measurements. The best known of these are MGA (and the related MGAU code for uranium 
isotopes) by Gunnink (1987), TRIFID (also known as GRPAUT) by Fleissner (1981) and 
FRAM by Sampson et al (1989) which are often employed in conjunction with low-energy, 
high resolution germanium detectors. Such systems do not require efficiency calibrations and 
can accurately produce isotopic ratios using, most often, low energy high resolution 
spectrometry (sub 600 eV at 122 keV). It was assumed that the majority of the MALRAD 
participants would not have had access to such codes and even if they had, the nature of the 
detector used in the scenario would have possibly complicated the task. It should be noted that 
subtleties such as different peak shapes for x-rays and gamma rays were not accounted for and 
the spectra as presented for MALRAD may not have been appropriate for use with specialised 
codes, in particular those represented by the MG++ suite. In this context, attempting to 
determine the composition of the sample would most likely have to have been achieved using 
conventional software tools to hand. In general, gamma ray spectra of plutonium can be 
divided up into a number of “standard” regions of analysis and some of these regions are 
those most commonly focused upon by custom codes. Full details of Pu analysis by gamma 
ray spectrometry may be found in a number of sources including, for example, Dragnev and 
Scharf (1975), Agarwal et al (2009), Keegan and Gehrke (2003) and the comprehensive if 
slightly older texts by Sampson et al (1982) and Sampson (1986). Although it is recognized 
that the participants could have devised any of a number of potential schemes for effecting 
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analysis, one common and potentially applicable scheme is outlined here. Perhaps the best 
option for estimating the 239Pu/240Pu relationship was the region around 640-650 keV. This 
part of the spectrum features peaks from both isotopes in close conjunction – eliminating 
problems associated with efficiency variations and varying attenuation caused by the 
cladding. This is in essence the only part of the spectrum that can be conveniently used for 
coaxial detectors and functions only in cases with large samples (such as MALRAD). The 
usefulness of the region is due to the gamma line at 642.3 keV from 240Pu and the nearby 
645.9 keV peak from 239Pu. The 240Pu line is interfered with by a line from 241Am at 641.5 
keV but the distance is such that it should be possible to deconvolute the multiplet using 
conventional software. This was performed using Interactive Peakfit® from Canberra and the 
results are displayed in Figure 5. As can be seen in Figure 5, relative to the “true” areas of the 
peaks, the results from deconvolution using general purpose tools are reasonable. Based on 
the two areas of 12982 for the 240Pu peak and 64711 for the 239Pu peak with emission 
intensities of 0.000013 and 0.0000152 respectively, an activity ratio of 239Pu/240Pu ≈ 4.26 
could be estimated. Using the simple approach of employing specific activities of the 
respective isotopes indicates a mass ratio for 239Pu/240Pu of  ≈ 15.55 (240Pu/239Pu of ≈ 0.06) 
which should be sufficient to declare the sample to be low burn up weapons grade plutonium 
as opposed to high burn up reactor grade plutonium.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure  5. Deconvolution of the 630 to 650 keV region of the Scenario 2 spectrum. 
Determined areas provided in parenthesis with actual areas preceding. 
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Determining the age of a plutonium sample since last separation is not a trivial task and 
especially with the materials as provided to participants. Possible parent-daughter relations for 
plutonium are: 238Pu/234U, 239Pu/235U, 240Pu/236U, 241Pu/241Am and 242Pu/238U. In reality only a 
very limited number of these are of any use and the one that features most often is the 
241Pu/241Am ratio. The problem is of course finding a region where 241Am and 241Pu have their 
own well separated peaks of similar energies which is not simple. A possible way around this 
is to find another isotope which facilitates the task and allows 241Am to be expressed relative 
241Pu via an intermediary. The region between 143 keV and 151 keV is of potential interest in 
this regard containing peaks from 241Pu, 241Am and 239Pu in close proximity although some 
are parts of complex multiplets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Deconvolution of the 142 keV to 152 keV region of the spectrum of Scenario 2. 
Determined areas provided in parenthesis with actual areas preceding. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6, conventional tools are reasonably sufficient to separate out the 
two main peaks of 239Pu and 241Pu but not the 241Am/241Pu doublet in the centre portion. 
Based on the two former one could estimate an activity ratio for 239Pu/241Pu based on areas 
and emission probabilities of 71074 and 0.000283 for 239Pu and 111210 and 0.0001855 for 
241Pu. This ratio is approximately ≈ 0.418. The second part of the process would therefore be 
estimating the relationship between 241Am and 239Pu. This can be achieved using the 169.6 
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keV peak of 241Am and the nearby 171.4 keV peak of 239Pu. Using the values provided by this 
deconvolution provides an approximate 241Am/239Pu activity ratio of 
(13322/0.000173)/(57234/0.00011) = 0.148. Combining this with the earlier 239Pu/241Pu ratio 
of 0.418 provides an activity ratio for 241Am/241Pu of 0.0618 (or 16.1812 for 241Pu/241Am). 
Using a specific activity of 1.3E+14  Bq/kg for 241Am and 3.8E+15  Bq/kg for 241Pu provides 
a crude mass ratio ≈ 1.8067 (or ≈ 0. 5535 for 241Pu/241Am). Using the relationship provided by 
Wallenius and Mayer (2000) of 241Pu/241Am = 20.159X –1.2071 for the ingrowth of 241Am to the 
parent would thus provide an gross estimate of the age of the plutonium of ≈ 20 years which 
is a reasonable estimate given the data to hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Deconvolution of the 166 keV to 174 keV region of the Scenario 2 spectrum. 
Determined areas provided in parenthesis with actual areas preceding. 
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2.2.1 Reported Results 
 
Participant Reported Data 
1 Source identified from spectrum as 
239Pu.  Source strength estimated at 0.6 GBq or 0.3 g (range 
0.1-0.5 g) based on spectrum and detector information. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 239Pu , 241Am, 240Pu, 241Pu  
5 Unidentified 
6 No data reported 
7 
The source is “weapon-grade” plutonium (239Pu) of high activity. Presence of other Pu isotopes 
can be found in the gamma-spectrum: 240Pu, 241Pu with daughter 241Am, and 242Pu. Estimated 
activity of 239Pu is of the order of 40 GBq (around 1 Ci). 
8 
The cylinder contains plutonium isotopes (238, 239, 240, 241) and 241Am ingrown from 241Pu. 
By comparing the peaks at 152 keV (238Pu), 129 keV (239Pu) and 148 keV ( 
241Pu) we conclude that it is weapons grade Pu, containing about 90% 239Pu. As you do not  
want more than 7% 240Pu in a weapon (it undergoes spontaneous fission), the  
enrichment of 239Pu is probably more close to 93%. With an ultra high resolution HPGe we 
could probably deconvolute the 240Pu peak near 104 keV and 160 keV and know the exact 
enrichment of Pu. The amount of plutonium in the cylinder could also be calculated if we knew 
if there is any other shielding present in the cylinder, or by  
comparing intensities of different peaks. The amount of plutonium present in the  
cylinder would also tell us the age of the plutonium by comparing 241Am and 241Pu.   
9 Plutonium, probably 239Pu. 
10 The analysis suggests a mixture of 137Cs and 241Am. 
11 239Pu, 240Pu (traces), 500 GBq, Weapons-grade plutonium 
12 
We assume that the spectrum is correct, though it is strange that there are no peaks above 1 
MeV. We think we can distinguish 237U in the spectrum, which is a daughter of 241Pu. It 
therefore could be plutonium, but it is troublesome that we do not see the 113 keV peak of 
239Pu. But since we also see 233Pa and 237Np, we still think the source is plutonium, maybe 
enriched in 241Pu. The source also consists of 241Am, another daughter of 241Pu.There are a lot 
of other peaks in the spectrum. It may be other nuclides added to disguise the plutonium. Of 
these we think 177mLu and 113Sn with daughter 113mIn are good candidates, since they have 
several peaks around the important peaks of 237U. 
13 Pu detected: 
238Pu ~ 0.01%; 239Pu ~ 59.98%; 240Pu ~ 37.78%; 241Pu ~ 1.68%; 242Pu ~ 0.52%; 
241Am ~ 1.48% 
14 
The source is identified as WGPu (isotopic composition: (93.6±0.2) % 239Pu, (6.3±0.2) % 240Pu, 
(0.112±0.002) % 241Pu, and (0.006±0.002) % 238Pu, (k=2)). It was last separated around Dec. 
1983 (± 2 years). 
15 No data reported 
16 
This sample contains 239Pu, 240Pu and 241Pu and also 241Am. There are also a lot of other peaks, 
e.g. from 137Cs, that may be rests from the reprocessing, formed by spontaneous fission or 
added deliberately to “hide” the Pu. 
17 
Approximate weight percent, evaluated from spectrum analysis: 238Pu 0.01%; 239Pu            
96.18%; 240Pu 3.56%; 241Pu 0.06%; 242Pu unknown; 241Am 0.09% plus amounts of 237U. 241Am 
separated ~ 20.2 ± 6.5 years before measurement. 
18 
This is a spectrum dominated by more than 70 identified 239Pu peaks.  There is also 241Pu 
present (one peak at 148.6 keV) and 241Am with a few. Assuming now that the source is aged 
plutonium we can solve the Bateman equation and estimate the age since reprocessing to be 14 
years. This means that the 241Pu/239Pu atom ratio at discharge was twice 0.15%, i.e. 0.30%. This 
is much closer to typical weapons grade plutonium with a ratio of 0.15% than to reactor grade 
plutonium with a 241Pu/239Pu atom ratio which is more like 10% at discharge. The source seems 
to be a 14 years old some 10 g piece of weapons grade plutonium. 
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2.2.2. Discussion 
The spectrum of Scenario 2 should theoretically have been relatively easy to identify as being 
Pu of some sort. The difficulty with the source lay in trying to ascertain exactly what type of 
Pu was present and to derive further information as to isotope ratios etc. Most participants 
managed to pinpoint 239Pu in the spectrum and some were in a position to attempt a deeper 
analysis as to whether or not the material was weapons grade. It is most probable that in such 
a situation, identification of 239Pu, irrespective of whether or not one decides it is weapons 
grade, would be sufficienct to necessitate contacting international authorities. A significant 
number of the participants were in a position to ascertain that the material was weapons grade 
plutonium. More advanced analysis was not evident in the majority of the participants reports 
although some provided information as to isotopic composition which is not an elementary 
task with the material to hand. A few participants attempted to determine time since last 
separation and in two of these cases the estimates were quite close (within error) to the actual 
age of the plutonium. One participant derived a quite accurate value for the time of last 
separation in addition to having ascertained an accurate picture of the isotopic composition. It 
is quite satisfying to observe that one participant was willing to put forward the possibility 
that other isotopes had been included in an attempt to hide the nature of the source – an 
activity which has been encountered before primarily in “spoofing” or masking techniques 
where depleted or natural uranium is used to shield enriched uranium and confuse detectors 
for illicit purposes and which demonstrated an awareness of potential aspects of the problem 
presented which may not have been obvious to everyone. In general it is possible to 
hypothesise that there is a general lack of unfamiliarity with SNM in emergency situations – 
both in identifying what types of material are present and in what information can be 
extracted from such samples even using relatively unsophisticated software. The argument 
that the probability of such materials being encountered by most organizations is very low can 
be countered by the fact that there have been more incidents of interdicted plutonium than 
there have been of RDD’s for which practicing and training is conducted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
2.3 Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 was intended to simulate the use of radiation for murder such as has occurred in a 
number of cases but of most relevance in this instance is the incident where a Chinese nuclear 
scientist, Gu Jiming, employed 192Ir pellets in an attack on a business rival. Having used 
forged papers to acquire an industrial device containing 192Ir, the source was then placed in 
the ceiling panels in the hospital office of the victim. The victim reported symptoms including 
memory loss, fatigue, appetite loss, headaches, vomiting, and bleeding gums. Another 74 staff 
members of the hospital, including one pregnant woman, also exhibited symptoms. Gu was 
convicted for the crime on the 29th of September 2003 (Nature, 2003). The context of the 
placing of the source for Scenario 3 was taken from the situation involving the exposure of a 
man in Russia as a result of a 1.3 Ci 137Cs source having being maliciously placed in the door 
of his truck as reported by Sevan'kaev et al (1999). The source in Scenario 3 consisted of the 
isotope 192Ir in the form of brachytherapy seeds. The source was assumed to have been an 
effective point source of 11.1 GBq (300 mCi) of 192Ir placed in the car seat of the victim. The 
shielding provided by the car was assumed to be equivalent to 4 mm of iron (taking into 
account the construction of the car itself plus shielding provided by the seat of the car). Self 
absorption within the seeds was assumed to be negligble. A  point source spectrum of 241Am, 
137Cs and 60Co was also provided for energy and shape calibration. Dose measurements were 
also taken at a point 2 m from the source (1.8 m from the car + 20 cm to the source) where the 
dose rate was 229 µSv/hr and at 4 m from the source where the dose was 57 µSv/hr. The 
detector used in the scenario was a CdZnTe detector of 3 cm3 volume with a supposed 
resolution at 1332 keV of 16 keV. The spectrum was taken over 4096 channels covering the 
energy range 10 keV to 1500 keV (0.36376 keV/channel) for a period of 60 seconds. Random 
statistical noise was added to the spectrum but no background. As a follow up, the same 
source/shielding configuration was used in conjunction with a HPGe detector of 50% relative 
efficiency and 1.9 keV resolution at 1332 keV over 8 k channels between 10 and 1500 keV 
(0.18189 keV/channel) for the same time period. Assuming correct identification of the 
isotope as 192Ir, it should have been possible to derive an estimate of  activity based upon the 
standard formulae as presented earlier in this text. The participants had been informed that 
two measurements were made  - the first being 1.8 m from the side of the car where the dose 
was 229 µSv/hr and one 2 m further back where the dose was 57 µSv/hr. Using a gamma 
constant for 192Ir of 0.1394  and the two distances from the source combined with the two 
dose measurements provides activity estimates of 5.3 GBq and 5.9 GBq which are reasonable 
estimates of the source activity of 11.1 GBq allowing for the thin shielding present and the 
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inaccuarcy of the source-meter distance. The identification of the source as 192Ir should not 
have presented significant problems. Although the doublet at 201 keV to 206 keV is probably 
unresolvable the peak should be identified as 205 keV which is one of the characteristic peaks 
for 192Ir. The quadruplet at 280 – 320 keV is, given a reasonabe shape calibration and the 
better resolution of CdZnTe, easily deconvoluted (see Figure 8.) and provides further useful 
information as to the identity of the isotope. The triplet between 580 – 620 keV is also 
automatically resolved (Figure 9) and the information from these two areas should have been 
sufficient to facilitate a positive identification. 
 
Figure 8. Automatic deconvolution of the quadruplet in the region of 280 keV to 320 keV. 
 
 
Figure 9. Automatic deconvolution of the triplet between 580 keV and 620 keV. 
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2.3.1 Reported Results 
 
Participant Reported Data 
1 
Source identified as 192Ir from spectrum. Source strength estimated at 0.19 Ci or 7 GBq 
from dose rate measurements.  The source strength is consistent with that of a low dose 
rate brachytherapy source.  This seems consistent with the exposed person’s 
occupation as a scientist in a large medical research facility. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 192Ir 
5 Unidentified 
6 No data reported 
7 The source is 
192Ir. The estimated activity is about 7 GBq according to dose rate 
measurements on site. 
8 
The source is 192Ir. The dose-rate readings suggest a dose rate of about 0.1 mSv/h in  
contact with the source. This suggests that the source is either partly shielded with 
lead, or is an old industrial source. The calculated dose rate is too low to give radiation  
sickness symptoms. It may be that the sick person has tried to take out a fresh source  
(containing GBq’s of  192Ir) and suffered a high dose. A 1500 GBq point source of  
192Ir has a dose rate of about 170 mSv/hr at 1 m distance. The dose rates are obviously 
much higher in contact. 
9 Medical or industrial source of 192Ir.  
10 Analysis suggests 192Ir. 
11 192Ir, 7 GBq, Brachytherapy wire 
12 This is most probably 
192Ir. Assuming the source being 20 cm inside the car then the 
dose measurements suggests an activity of 8.5 GBq. 
13 192Ir, 6.3 GBq 
14 The source is identified as 192Ir. The activity is estimated to be at least 5 GBq. 
15 No data reported 
16 The activity is 192Ir. The dose rate 10 cm from the source should be about 90 mSv/h. 
17 192Ir source of activity about 18 GBq 
18 
There is a (most probably) medical therapy source of around 0.2 Ci 192Ir  just inside the 
car. A typical amount sold for medical applications (brachytherapy) is 1-10 Ci so it is 
most probably taken from the medical research facility where the scientist was 
working. Industrial sources for radiography are normally one or two orders of 
magnitude larger.  
 
2.3.2. Discussion 
The vast majority of participants readily identified the source as 192Ir and most were in a 
position to estimate activity even with a low-resolution spectrum. It was satisfying to observe 
that some participants used the ancilliary information provided in the scenario description 
(such as the location) to attempt to assign a source type (brachytherapy source) which is of 
course an important consideration in response to such situations.  Activity determinations 
were most probably satisfactory for emergency response to this type of scenario.  
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2.4 Scenario 4 
The purpose of this scenario was to simulate the use of irradiated graphite in a malevolent act. 
Such materials have been employed maliciously before, in particular the use of irradiated 
graphite under the driver's seat of a victims car inflicting a sustained 0.25 - 0.30 Gy dose to 
his spinal bone marrow and 4 -5 Gy to his testes (Mullen, 1987). The material was included in 
MALRAD due to its being possibly less securely guarded than high level materials (and 
therefore easier to steal or obtain) and its being an interesting source in relation to identifying 
the material. The scenario intended to simulate a situation where the material had been spread 
over an area and in-situ measurements were made in an attempt to identify the material. 1 kg 
of graphite of density 2 g/cm was assumed to have been spread over 5000 cm2 to an average 
thickness of 1 mm. Due to there being little available information as to the actual activity of 
activated graphite, the work of Ancius et al (2005) was used and the graphite for Scenario 4 
was assumed to have been 10 years old. Calculations for this time period indicate no 
appreciable build up of daughter products. The activity details of gamma emitting isotopes in 
the dispersed graphite are contained in Table  III. 
 
Isotope Total activity Bq 
60Co 1.9E+07 
244Cm 1.6E+07 
137Cs 1.6E+05 
154Eu 1.1E+05 
155Eu 1.8E+04 
 
Table III. Isotope content of the dispersed source of Scenario 4. 
 
A 3 x 3 NaI detector (10 – 2500 keV, 7% @ 661 keV, 1.2158 keV/channel, 2048 channels) 
was suspended 50 cm above the planar source and a spectrum taken for a period of 20 
minutes. A point source spectrum of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 88Y and 60Co was also provided. No 
background was added. The primary features of the spectrum as provided were the two 
characteristic  peaks of 60Co at 1173 and 1332 keV which completely dominate the spectrum. 
The higher activity of this isotope plus the strength of its emissions tended to obscure most 
other features of the spectrum although the 661 keV peak of 137Cs and the 123 keV peak of 
154Eu were theoretically visible. The sub 100 keV region was dominated primarily by x-rays 
of the Eu isotopes. It is doubtful whether successful identification of the isotopes involved 
other than 60Co and 137Cs could be conducted based on the spectrum to hand or whether or not 
the material itself would be identified for what it was. A strong potential existed for the 
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misidentification of the two lower energy peaks as perhaps 57Co or other nuclides. As a follow 
up, the same source and point source were “measured” on a HPGe detector (50% nominal rel. 
efficiency, 1.9 keV at 1332 keV, 0.30395 keV/channel) of 8k channels over the same energy 
range for the same time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure   10. Total NaI spectrum for Scenario 4 with component spectra for individual 
constituent isotopes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  11. Comparison of NaI and HPGe spectra of the source for Scenario 4. 
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2.4.1. Reported Results. 
 
Participant Reported Data 
1 
Source identified from spectrum as 60Co mainly, with traces of 57Co and 137Cs.  Source 
strength of 60Co estimated from dose rate measurements at 0.5 mCi or 0.2 MBq.  Might 
be an old low dose rate brachytherapy source, but there are many possibilities. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 60Co,other peaks inconclusive. 
5 60Co 
6 No data reported 
7 The source is 
60Co. The estimated activity is about 20 MBq according to dose rate 
measurements on site. 
8 
The black powder contains 60Co with traces of what seems to be 137Cs. It’s a bit strange 
that 137Cs is there. Can it be that the detector is contaminated? It is difficult to say   
anything about the amount of 60Co present since we do not know the distance between 
the dose rate meter and the powder, or the spreading of the powder.   
9 60Co, cobalt-based powder.  
10 The analysis suggests high levels of 60Co. 
11 60Co, 57Co (traces), 50 MBq 
12 
The source is predominantly 60Co, but there are also some other nuclides which we 
think are 137Cs and 57Co. If we assume a large area is contaminated, the activity would 
be 0.1 GBq/m2 of 60Co, 0.7 MBq/m2 of 137C and 0.2 MBq/m2 of 57Co. 
13 60Co 20.3 MBq; 137Cs trace activity; 57Co  trace activity 
14 
The source is identified as 60Co, with a minor contamination of 57Co. In addition there 
is a small amount of 137Cs. Furthermore, there are a few peaks in the spectrum that are 
not positively identified that may call for further investigation of the surroundings and 
possibly using high resolution gamma spectrometry. Assuming the dose rate was 
measured at 0.5 m a rough estimate gives an activity of approximately 20 MBq. 
15 No data reported 
16 The activity is 
60Co. There might be a very small amount of 137Cs as well but this is 
uncertain. 
17 No report for this scenario 
18 The source is a detector calibration kit sized sample of essentially 
60Co. Small amounts 
of other common calibration nuclides are also seen. 
 
 
2.4.2. Discussion 
Scenario 4 was always potentially difficult given both the nature of the spectrum and the 
material involved. The low resolution of the spectrum plus the disparate intensities of the 
gamma line spresent all served to complicate the identification. All participants were in a 
position to pinpoint 60Co and some were able to report 137Cs although a number of 
participants suspected that th e661 keV peak was actually a single escape from the 1173 keV 
line of 60Co. Beyond these two isotopes, 57Co appears to have been the primary candidate for 
the visible low energy peaks in the spectrum. Scenario 4 along with Scenarios 5 and 7 was a  
scenario where the source was actually visible – reported as a “black powder” by cleaners and 
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indeed pictured in the scenario materials as distributed. In combination with the context of the 
occurrence, in relation to suspicious activities at nuclear facilities earlier, it was hoped that 
participants may have narrowed their thinking to a black granular material, possibly sourced 
from a nuclear facility, displaying significant (but not particularly dangerous) levels of 60Co, 
137Cs and other isotopes. In which case irradiated graphite could theoretically have turned up 
as a candidate. Although literature material on irradiated graphite is not very common, the 
usual presence of 60Co, 137Cs and Eu isotopes is fairly well described in available materials 
and it was hoped this might have spurred participants on towards hazarding a guess. Irradiated 
graphite has featured before in malevolent acts, is a substance that could theoretically be 
viewed as attractive (from a security point of view) to activists and for which significant 
amounts exist in some countries. Activity estimates from most participants were quite good.  
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2.5 Scenario 5 
This scenario involved the placing of a radioactive source on a bus intended to be 
representative of the type of situations where radioactive sources have been left in public 
places for whatever purposes. A 99Tc generator was chosen largely due to the relatively easy 
availability of such materials. The source in this case was a standard medical 99Mo/99mTc 
generator.  For the purpose of the exercise the source was assumed to be a 10 day old 
generator whose activity was 40 GBq at time 0. After 10 days the activity was 40 x 0.0804 
99Mo, 40 x 0.0775 99mTc (3.216 GBq 99Mo and 3.1 GBq 99mTc). The detector was a typical 
handheld 2 x 2 inch NaI detector, of resolution 7% at 661 keV. The spectrum was taken one 
meter from the source for a period of 10 mins over 2048 channels covering 10 keV to 2500 
keV (1.2158 keV/channel).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparsion of provided and high resolution (no background) spectra from 
Scenario 5. 
A background signal was also added to the spectrum manifesting itself primarily as a 40K 
peak at 1460 keV. A point source spectrum was provided of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 88Y and 60Co 
at a distance of 10 cm from the detector. The follow up spectrum was that of the same source 
using a HPGe detector (1.9 keV @ 1332 keV) 50 % relative efficiency using 8192 channels 
covering the same energy range. A dose rate measurement was made at 1 m distance and this 
was 131 µSv/hr.  Determination of activity in this instance should have been relatively simple 
in this case. If the assumption was made that the isotope was 99Mo/99mTc then given the half-
lives it would be reasonable to assume that the two isotopes were in transient equilibrium and 
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therefore of approximately equal activities. Lists of gamma rate constants for isotopes 
typically provide data for parents including short lived daughters in equilibrium. Data for 
99Mo is 0.04426 providing an activity estimate of  2.9 GBq 99Mo  and approximately the same 
activity for the daughter.  
 
 
Figure 13. Deconvolution of the regions between 130 keV and 200 keV (top) and 660 keV and 
1000 keV (bottom) for Scenario 5. 
 
Identification of the source of Scenario 5 should have not proven too problematical. The large 
combined peak at 140 keV for 99mTc and 99Mo was readily identifiable as was the peak at 181 
keV (Figure 13) and the area between 600 and 1000 keV with a number of peaks should have 
facilitated identification as 99Mo with 99mTc as assumed. 
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2.5.1. Reported Results. 
 
Participant Reported Data 
1 
Source identified from spectrum as 99Mo.  Source strength estimated from dose rate 
measurements at 0.20 Ci or 7 GBq.  The source strength suggests that this could come 
from a diagnostic isotope generator. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 No reliable/conclusive results 
5 99Mo 
6 No data reported 
7 The source is 
99Mo. The estimated activity is about 6 GBq according to dose rate 
measurements on site. 
8 
This is a 99Mo-99mTc generator. Since white powder is visible (most probably Al2O3  
which is used on a column to separate Tc from Mo) the column must be broken. But,  
since the radioactivity symbol still is there, some of the lead shielding still is present.  
Since it is dripping from the package it may indicate that this is a so-called “wet- 
generator”. A “wet-generator” contains all the liquid needed for all the elutions during  
the life-time of a generator. This may indicate that the generator is fairly fresh. The  
amount of 99Mo present in a generator varies considerably (GBq levels). 
9 
99Mo/99mTc.  Probably a 99mTc generator (based on a source of 99Mo) was stolen, 
destroyed and white powder taken in the form of molybdate. 
10 The analysis suggests high levels of 
99mTc and 99Mo. That the source is liquid is 
plausible. 
11 99Mo, 99mTc, 3 GBq 
12 
This is 99Mo/99mTc. The 140 keV line is strong and we assume equilibrium of the 
activity. Then, based on the dose measurement, the activity of the source is 
approximately 3.3 GBq of each nuclide. 
13  99mTc + 99Mo  3.1 GBq 
14 The source is identified as 99Mo/99mTc.The activity is estimated to be at least 3 GBq. 
15 No data reported 
16 The sample contains 
99Mo and its daughter 99mTc. The dose rate at 10 cm distance 
should be about 13 mSv/h. 
17 No report for this scenario 
18 
99Mo (including 99mTc) gives 6.36 μSv/h per MBq unshielded at 1 m distance. Here 
99% is due to bremsstrahlung from the beta decay of 99Mo. From this we can estimate 
from the 131 μSv/h detected at 1 m (ignoring a 0.1 μSv/h background) the source to be 
some 20 MBq. A typical technetium cow (sometimes called moly-cow) used at 
hospitals contains some 200 MBq at start so this seems to be a finished cow (about one 
week old). The source is a “last week” technetium cow with a current activity of some 
20 MBq 99Mo (T1/2 = 2.75 d). 
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2.5.2 Discussion 
Scenario 5 was potentially the simplest of all the scenarios in that the spectrum was relatively 
simple, the physical description of the source was such that participants could narrow their 
candidates and there was no effective shielding. The white powder as described, along with 
the “wet” nature of the material was intended to indicate a 99mTc/99Mo generator and it was 
satisfying that at least some participants were willing to take this information on board and 
use it in their conclusions. All participants were able to identify the source for what it was and 
activity estimates were realistic in the majority of cases. There was some potential for 
difficulty in that while the characteristic spectrum of 99mTc may have been known to many 
due to its use as a tracer, the presence of 99Mo peaks may have caused confusion although it 
appears that most participants were confident in their identification. In one report where the 
activity was underestimated, bremsstrahlung had been incorporated into the dose measured. 
Although this demonstrates thorough knowledge of the situation, the effect of beta particles 
had been stated in the exercise instructions to have not played a role in the scenario 
simulations but the logic of the participant was quite correct and it was quite encouraging to 
see this aspect being considered. 
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2.6 Scenario 6 
The sixth scenario was directed towards simulating a situation involving theft of a source 
(either on purpose or by accident) which in this instance was the radiographic isotope 75Se. 
The source consisted of 1480 GBq (40 Ci) of 75Se which is a midrange activity for 75Se based 
industrial radiography sources. The source was positioned within a pile of scrap such that an 
effective shielding of 10 cm of aluminium was covering the source. The detector was a 3 cm3 
CdZnTe detector positioned 5 m from the source (including the 10 cm of Al). The detector 
had a relative efficiency of 1% and a resolution of 16 keV at 1332 keV. A spectrum was taken 
for 20 seconds over 2048 channels covering 10 keV to 1500 keV (0.72755 keV/channel). No 
background was added. A low energy scattering continuum was added to the spectrum. As 
follow up, a HPGe spectrum was taken under the same conditions as for the CdZnTe 
spectrum over 8192 channels for the same energy range (0.18189 keV/channel). The 
background corrected dose rate at a distance of 5 m from the pile surface was 0.802 mSv/hr 
and at 10 m from the pile surface 0.201 mSv/hr.  The presence of shielding of an unknown 
thickness complicates the activity estimate in this instance. A crude estimate based on the two 
dose measurements taken and assuming no shielding would provide activity estimates of  302 
GBq and 303 GBq which are substantially lower than the actual value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Transmission curve for Scenario 6 in the presence of 10 cm of aluminium. 
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Figure 15. Comparison of CdZnTe and HPGe spectra for the 75Se source of Scenario 6. 
 
Identification of the source as 75Se should, in itself, be a simple matter given that a number of 
clearly resolved strong singlets are present in the spectrum. It is of course possible that 
analysts may not have been familiar with the isotope or perhaps their library did not contain it 
but in instances where it did, it is difficult to see what else it could have been confused for. 
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 2.6.1. Reported Results. 
 
Participant Reported Data 
1 
Source identified as 75Se from spectrum.  Source strength estimated at 10 Ci or 0.4 
TBq from dose rate measurements.  The source strength suggests that this is an 
industrial radiography source that is about a year old. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 No reliable/conclusive results. 
5 75Se,  
6 No data reported 
7 The source is 
75Se. The estimated activity is about 380 GBq (>10 Ci) according to dose 
rate measurements on site. 
8 
The source is 75Se. Since the dose rate is about 0.8 mSv/hr at a distance of 5 m from 
the pile surface, and about 0.2 mSv/hr 5 m back, the source is located near the surface 
of the pile. If we guess that the source has about 1 cm of iron in front of it, it’s strength 
could be about 700 GBq. 
9 
75Se. Probably the source was 75Se capsules (a metal combined with selenium) used in 
pipline gamma radiography which were thrown away.  
10 Our analysis suggests 75Se. 
11 75Se, 350 GBq, Industrial source 
12 All the lines in this spectrum can be explained by a single nuclide, 
75Se. Based on the 
dose measurements the source is at least 410 GBq. 
13 75Se  568.5 GBq 
14 The source is identified as 
75Se (after a recalibration of the spectrum with respect to 
energy). The activity is estimated to be at least 400 GBq. 
15 No data reported 
16 
The source is 75Se. The dose rate should be about 80 mSv/h at 0.5 m distance and 8 
Sv/h at 5 cm distance, i.e. in this scenario the source is so strong that it will require a 
lot of radiation protection measures to remove it. 
17 75Se source of activity about 370 GBq. 
18 The source is a 
75Se  source of about 100 GBq at the surface of the metal scrap pile. It 
is probably a lost source from a sheet metal thickness gauge used in industry. 
 
 
2.6.2 Discussion 
The organizers had considered that 75Se would have been representative of a range of “exotic” 
industrial isotopes that can turn up as part of specialized applications and that possibly in this 
context it would have proved a challenge. However all participants managed to identify it for 
what it was. Activity estimates were in all cases low as a result of the shielding present but it 
is doubtful whether or not the difference between estimated value and actual would have 
resulted in any difference in the type of response initiated. 
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2.7 Scenario 7 
The source in this scenario was considered to be an amount of highly enriched uranium and 
was intended to represent a situation whereby a laboratory may be asked to analyse a sample 
of nuclear material which it may be assumed is outside the suite of usual activities of many 
labs and yet represents a situation that may feasibly arise. The basis of the source was the 
composition of the smuggled uranium seized in Bulgaria in 1999 (LLNL, 2001). The isotopic 
composition of this uranium was as, at the time of its seizure, as displayed in Table IV. For 
MALRAD, all isotopes except those of uranium were removed from the consideration and the 
uranium composition of the material in the Bulgarian sample was assumed to be that at the 
time of last purification. This was then allowed to decay for a period of ten years and the 
daughters calculated. The sample was considered to be 10 g which was then counted 10 cm 
above the surface of a HPGe detector. The activities of the uranium isotopes were derived 
from the mass composition as per Table V. The activities of the isotopes and ingrown 
daughters are displayed in Table VI and any daughter with an activity over 20 Bq was 
included in the simulation. 
 
242Pu   4.6x10-9 238U  13.9 231Pa  4.6x10-7
241Pu  7.9x10-9 236U   11.9 230Th   2.0x10-5
240Pu  2.6x10-8 235U  72.7 229Th   9.9x10-10
239Pu 2.2x10-7 234U  1.1 228Th  2.6x10-8
238Pu 1.1x10-8 233U   2.9x10-5 227Ac   3.3x10-11
137Cs   4.6x10-10 134Cs   3.3x10-13 125Sn   5.3x10-11
237Np  6.6x10-7 232U  1.1x10-6 226Ra   6.3x10-10
 
Table IV. Isotopic composition of the siezed uranium %w/w (LLNL, 2001) as the basis for 
Scenario 7.. 
 
 
Isotope 238U 236U 235U 234U 233U 232U 
w/w % of U 1.39E+01 1.19E+01 7.27E+01 1.10E+00 2.90E-05 1.10E-06 
Mass of sample g 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Isotope mass 1.39E+00 1.19E+00 7.27E+00 1.10E-01 2.90E-06 1.10E-07 
Specific activity Bq/g 1.20E+04 2.40E+06 8.00E+04 2.30E+08 3.60E+08 7.90E+11 
Sample activity Bq 1.67E+04 2.86E+06 5.82E+05 2.53E+7 1.04E+3 7.89E+4 
 
Table V. Isotopic composition of the uranium of Scenario 7. 
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 Bq  Bq  Bq  Bq  Bq  Bq 
238U 1.67E+4 236U 2.86E+6 235U 5.82E+5 234U 2.53E+7 233U 1.04E+3 232U 7.89E+4 
234Th 1.67E+4 232Th 1.41E-3 231Th 5.82E+5 230Th 2.28E+3 229Th 9.85E-1 228Th 7.87E+4 
234mPa 1.66E+4 228Ra 5.92E-4 231Pa 1.23E+2 226Ra 4.93E+0 225Ra 9.80E-1 224Ra 7.87E+4 
234Pa 5.50E+1 228Ac 5.92E-4 227Ac 1.76E+1 222Rn 4.91E+0 225Ac 9.76E-1 220Rn 7.87E+4 
234U 4.69E-1 228Th 3.72E-4 227Th 1.71E+1 218Po 4.91E+0 221Fr 9.76E-1 216Po 7.87E+4 
230Th 2.09E-5 224Ra 3.71E-4 223Fr 2.43E-1 214Pb 4.91E+0 217At 9.76E-1 212Pb 7.87E+4 
226Ra 2.99E-8 220Rn 3.71E-4 223Ra 1.72E+1 218At 9.82E-4 213Bi 9.76E-1 212Bi 7.87E+4 
222Rn 2.98E-8 216Po 3.71E-4 219Rn 1.72E+1 214Bi 4.91E+0 213Po 9.55E-1 212Po 5.04E+4 
218Po 2.98E-8 212Pb 3.71E-4 215Po 1.72E+1 214Po 4.91E+0 209Tl 2.11E-2 208Tl 2.83E+4 
214Pb 2.98E-8 212Bi 3.71E-4 211Pb 1.72E+1 210Pb 4.71E-1 209Pb 9.76E-1   
218At 5.95E-12 212Po 2.38E-4 211Bi 1.72E+1 210Bi 4.68E-1     
214Bi 2.98E-8 208Tl 1.33E-4 207Tl 1.72E+1 210Po 4.01E-1     
214Po 2.98E-8   211Po 4.82E-2       
210Pb 2.16E-9           
210Bi 2.15E-9           
210Po 1.76E-9           
 
Table VI. Isotopes and activities of the radionuclides in the source of Scenario 7. Shaded 
isotopes are those included. 
 
The density of uranium oxide was taken to be 10.96 g/cm3, the volume of the sample 
presented to the detector being 0.912 cm3, this being presented in the form of a compact disc 
2 cm in diameter and 2.9 mm in height. The detector was calibrated with an aqueous solution 
of equivalent geometry of the following nuclides: 241Am – 30000 Bq, 57Co – 10000 Bq, 60Co 
– 10000 Bq, 54Mn – 10000 Bq, 65Zn – 10000, 88Y – 10000 Bq, 137Cs – 10000 Bq and 109Cd – 
10000 Bq and counted in the same configuration (ie. 10 cm above the detector).  The 
composition of the uranium matrix was 11.85% w/w O and 88.15% w/w U. The sample was 
counted on a standard coaxial HPGe detector with a resolution of 1.8 keV at 1332 keV 
covering 10 to 3000 keV over 8k channels (0.36499 keV/channel). The calibration spectrum 
was provided such that participants could establish their own energy and shape calibration 
curve. Sufficient data was provided that the participants could derive a peak efficiency curve 
for the aqueous matrix although it is unlikely that such information would be of much use. 
Although the density of the material was provided, the extreme nature of that value (and the 
fact that it was primarily uranium) would most likely present severe difficulties in trying to 
correct the efficiency data. The mean free path length of sub-100 keV photons in such a 
matrix are significantly less than the thickness of the sample and this will present significant 
problems for a range of utilities commonly used for deriving density correction factors. 
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Significant complexity is also introduced due to the chemical composition of the matrix and it 
is doubtful whether such information could have been reproduced from the data provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Difference between the efficiency data provided (black points) and the actual 
efficiency of the uranium sample for Scenario 7. 
 
The accurate quantitative analysis of nuclear materials containing uranium at high levels is a 
specialized task and that is reflected in the number of published articles on the matter and the 
development of a number of specialized software tools for determining enrichment levels. 
The situation as presented in MALRAD could be considered somewhat realistic in that labs in 
many countries may not have experience in analyzing such materials and yet could 
theoretically find themselves in a position to have to attempt such an analysis with the 
instrumentation and staff to hand. In such a situation it could be reasonable to expect that an 
estimate could be made as to the nature of the material present, the enrichment level, the 
possible source of the material (fresh uranium, reprocessed etc) and an estimate of its age 
(since last purification). Although an extremely accurate analysis would necessitate 
procedures and instruments that may be beyond the capabilities of most national authorities or 
laboratories, it is possible to produce at least indicative estimates with the information to 
hand. 
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With respect to identification, although the number of peaks in the spectrum was large, the 
actual number of isotopes present was relatively small. The factor that could probably 
generate most problems in the analysis of such a spectrum is the fact that there are a large 
number of peaks present in the spectrum that are unlikely to appear in the isotope libraries of 
non-specialist laboratories due to their low emission probabilities and indeed a number of the 
isotopes present in the sample and of consequence are probably not present either. Although 
that should not actually hinder the analysis, misidentification of a host of peaks could 
theoretically lead to a wrong conclusion as to what the material actually consists of (nuclear 
waste, old fuel rods etc.).  
 
For identification, the lower energy region of the spectrum is problematic given the large 
number of conflicting peaks from both gamma rays and x-rays. At energies above 150 keV 
the situation is less complex. The dominant signal of the spectrum is the 185.7 keV peak 235U. 
The potential exists to misidentify it as 226Ra but the total lack of the strong (and easily 
recognizable) daughter peaks from that isotope should have led most analysts to conclude it 
was the uranium isotope. Once the identification of 235U was made, it should have been a 
logical conclusion that the material was enriched uranium of some kind especially given the 
lack of the usual 238U series gamma signals that occur after 226Ra. Two isotopes of 
consequence in deciding the nature of the material (i.e. that it was from reprocessed uranium 
as opposed to fresh) were 236U and 232U. Neither of these are simple isotopes for gamma 
spectrometry having weak emissions. The potential was present to identify 236U but 232U was 
essentially impossible using its own gammas. However 232U has a suite of short lived 
daughters which were in equilibrium with the parent and the presence of these, clearly visible 
in the spectrum, should have been sufficient to alert analysts to the presence of the parent. The 
potential difficulty arises however in that many analysts may not be familiar  with the decay 
chain of 232U and assume that the isotopes such as 224Ra, more commonly found as part of the 
232Th chain, had arisen from natural 232Th thereby introducing an erroneous conclusion. The 
source of the 224Ra and subsequent daughters sequence would however have been easily 
confimed had the analyst checked for the strong (and well known) emissions of the 228Ac 
daughter of 232Th which are not present in the 232U sequence.  Once 232U had been identified 
in the sample, the analyst should have been in a position to conclude that the material was 
enriched uranium and that it had been produced from uranium that was previously in a reactor 
and had possibly been reprocessed using a gas diffusion process (as gas centrifuges exhibit 
little or sometimes no 232U contamination). The knowledge that the material was processed 
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could probably lead to the logical hypothesis that 236U was present and a confirmatory search 
should then have proved the matter.  Once the material had been identified, the logical 
question would have been in relation to the level of enrichment and perhaps the age of the 
material, both requiring a quantitative estimate of activities (either absolute or relative to 
some isotope). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  17. The 40 to 140 keV region of the Scenario 7 spectrum with the two 236U peaks 
indicated. 
For MALRAD the participants were provided with some rudimentary efficiency data such as 
one may consider reasonable to generate in a regular laboratory working with gamma 
spectrometry with materials to hand. This efficiency data deviates significantly from that of 
the actual sample due to the density and composition of the sample matrix. That is not to say 
however that such data is useless and it was hoped that the participants would have come up 
with solutions to the problem. A potential simple solution to at least some of the problems 
presented is provided by the presence of 208Tl in the sample. The isolated position of the 
major peak of this isotope at the high energy end of the spectrum and its being a common 
feature of many environmental samples should have left most analysts in a position to identify 
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the isotope. Tl-208 exhibits a wide range of gamma energies between 211 keV and its main 
emission at 2614 keV, a number of which are relatively strong lines,  and has a suite of x-rays 
between 72 and 87 keV. These gamma emissions could theoretically constitute a means of 
correcting the efficiency data supplied in Scenario 7 and facilitating a rudimentary correction 
of the efficiency curve, thereby allowing reasonable estimates to be made as to the activity of 
isotopes in the sample. 
 
Using the calibration spectrum provided, the efficiency data was calculated and a standard 
efficiency plot drawn up. The following function was then fitted: log(Eff) = (-1.459E-4*E) – 
2.496 + (2.653e+2/E) – (3.601e+4/E2) + (1.994e+6/E3) – (4.131e+7/E4).  Based on this 
function the efficiency at 2614 keV was calculated to be 0.00165558. It can be reasonably 
assumed that photons of this energy would be only slightly impacted upon by self absorption 
with the thin sample of Scenario 7 and to check, a simple tool (Gamatool®) was used to 
determine the absorption correction and this was determined to be of the order of 3%. 
Applying this factor provided a corrected value of 0.0016059126 for the efficiency of the 
sample at 2614 keV. A selection of the best (or simplest) resolved peaks of 208Tl and their 
areas was then taken from the spectrum and based on an activity for 208Tl calculated using the 
peak at 2614 keV and the modified efficiency value at that energy, the efficiency data for the 
individual peaks was calculated (See Table VII). 
 
Energy keV Peak area Probability Bq Live time s Efficiency 
2614.00 910697 0.990000 28641 20000 0.001605913 
1093.90 7595 0.004000 28641 20000 0.003314741 
982.70 4238 0.002030 28641 20000 0.003644574 
860.50 289676 0.124200 28641 20000 0.004071672 
763.10 45962 0.018100 28641 20000 0.004433045 
583.20 2595951 0.845000 28641 20000 0.005363171 
277.40 275877 0.063100 28641 20000 0.007632520 
 
Table VII. Derived efficiency values for Scenario 7. Activity value for 208Tl being that derived 
from the peak area and corrected efficiency curve. 
 
This provides efficiency data that can be assumed to be reasonably accurate over a useful 
energy range for the spectrum. A function of the form log(Eff) = -1.285E-4*E – 2.564 + 
291.3/E – 4.372E+4/E2 was then fitted to this data allowing for the derivation of efficiency 
data for points between 277 keV and 2614 keV. Based on this information it was then 
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possible to derive activity information for two isotopes which should facilitate determination 
of the enrichment level of the material; 235U and 238U via its daughter 234mPa. 
 
Isotope Energy keV Area Probability Efficiency Activity 
235U 279.5 235046 0.0027 0.00763225 570304 
 345.4+345.9 92957 0.00108 0.00738633 582639 
 368.5 57662 0.0007 0.00719759 572235 
234mPa 766.4 4402 0.00294 0.00439716 17025 
 
Table VII. Derived data for 235U and 234mPa (and 238U). 
U-235 has a number of useful lines in the region for which efficiency data could be derived 
and using three of these an activity of 575059 Bq was determined. Although 234mPa has two 
useful lines, the more traditional 1001 keV peak was not used due to possible uncertainty in 
the emission probability and an activity of 17025 Bq for the isotope (and its parent 238U) was 
derived based on the weaker but still useful line at 766.4 Bq. The relationship provided by  
Rucker and Johnson (1998): 
( ) ( )2235238235238235 log129.0log7317.0065.1%log activityUUactivityUUUmass −−=  
was then used to estimate an enrichment value of 76.2% 235U which is a reasonable 
approximation of the modeled value of the actual value of approximately 72% and would be 
sufficient to classify the material as weapons grade. Although a full treatment of uncertainties 
is not included in the above it would be possible to provide a conservative estimate of the 
uncertainty in the final enrichment value. It should be noted that the situation is made 
complex by the significant, but unknown, amount of 236U present in the material. 
Alternatively it would be possible to derive an estimate of enrichment without having to 
assume a particular matrix correction factor for 208Tl by simply by expressing 234mPa and 235U 
relative to each other based on the efficiency “curve” provided by the 208Tl peaks. 
Determining the time since last purification of the sample is a less straightforward matter as 
such a determination is normally achieved by utilizing the ratio between 234U and 230Th 
neither of which are easily amenable to determination by gamma spectrometry. U-234 has a 
useable line at 53 keV but this would be difficult in the extreme to utilize given the nature of 
the sample and the absence of any information as to efficiency in this region. A second 
useable line at 121 keV is again at a difficult position on the normal efficiency curve.  Given 
the nature of the spectrum it is doubtful that the age of the sample could be determined with 
any accuracy by the majority of participants. 
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2.7.1. Reported Results. 
Participant Reported Data 
1 
The gamma spectrum of the sample shows the presence of uranium isotopes and 
daughters.  Evaluation of the spectrum indicates uranium content in the sample of 50-
60% (5-6 g of 10 g) and U enrichment (235U/235+238U) of 70-80%.  Sample could be 
uranium oxide. 
2 Participant withdrew 
3 Participant withdrew 
4 
Presence of  235U (3.35E+05 Bq), 224Ra,  212Pb, 208Tl (2.6646E+04 Bq), 140Ba, 239Np, 
109Cd, 147Nd,   234Th,   (2.1908E+03 Bq), 126Sb,   227Th,   (5.2542E+02 Bq) 99mTc    
We can also claim that 239Pu  had no in-range peaks. 
5 235U 
6 No data reported 
7 
The source is uranium-thorium mixture with the main isotopes 238U, 235U and 228Th. 
Available calibration data allow us to measure activities of radionuclides in the sample 
aliquot of 10 g. Hence, we get the following activity concentration of 238U, 235U and 
228Th: 2.5 MBq/kg, 35 MBq/kg and 8.0 MBq/kg, respectively. Uncertainties are up to 
30%. Thus, enrichment of uranium with the fissionable isotope 235U is estimated by 
around 70%. 
8 
The spectrum and the density suggests that the fine brown powder is UO2. It could 
have been UH3 as well, but since UH3 is pyroforic, we believe its not UH3. Analysis of  
235U (185 keV) and 238U (via 234mPa 1001 keV) gammalines suggests that the uranium 
is enriched. Our best guess is 70% enrichment, but it could be more due to the self-
absorption of the 186 keV gamma. 
9 Uranium, 235U. The powder could be a kind of uranium concentrate.  
10 Enriched uranium 
11 
232Th, 228Th (+ daughters),  235U (+ 231Th), 238U (+ 234Th, 234mPa); 228Th, 232Th - 25 kBq; 
235U - 300 kBq; 238U - 20 kBq;  Nuclear fuel, newly separated thorium + enriched 
uranium 
12 
The most pronounced nuclides are 224Ra, 212Pb, 212Bi and 208Tl. It could then be natural 
Thorium, but 228Ac is missing in the spectrum. We therefore suppose that  
the identified nuclides are progeny of 232U. It is a problem, though, that 208Tl is too 
strong compared to 212Pb and 212Bi. The Genie software also suggests 226Ra, but we 
discharge this nuclide since the spectrum does not contain 214Bi or 214Pb. The 186 keV 
peak is then most probably from 235U. So we take a long shot and assume the source is 
reprocessed uranium after irradiation of fuel that contains 232Th and highly enriched 
235U. The 232U is then produced in the 233U (n,2n)232U reaction.  
The activity of 235U is 0.3 MBq, and then the amount of 235U is approximately  
4 grams. If we base the evaluation of the amount of 232U on the activity of 208Tl of 1 
MBq (having appr. 1/3 of the activity of 232U) then the amount of 232U is 4e-7 grams 
which is very low and indicates that the irradiation was short. However, assuming a 
thermal reactor neutron spectrum this should give an amount of 233U in the order of 
0.01 grams. To summarize we think the source is 4 grams of 235U, 0.01 grams of 233U 
and trace amounts of 232U, 234Uand 236U. 
13 A mixture of 
235U/238U with daughters of 226Ra serves visible. Enrichment 235U   
0.299%,  238U 99.701%.    Depleted Uranium.  No artifical nuclides detected 
14 
The source is identified as HEU, around 80% 235U in the form of UO2. 
Traces of 232U daughters and 236U (from isotope correlation) in combination with high 
abundance of 234U, suggests enrichment from reprocessed uranium. 
15 No data reported 
16 
The presence of 208Tl and other members of the Th decay series indicate that the 
sample contains 232Th. The presence of 234Pa, which is a decay product of 238U, and the 
185 keV peak from 235U prove that uranium also is present. 
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17 
The source is Uranium Dioxide UO2 enriched 84.5 % in 235U with 228Th marker.The 
following radionuclides were found: 208Tl, 212Pb, 212Bi, 224Ra, 228Th, 231Pa, 234Th, 234m 
Pa, 234U, 235U, 238U. Activity concentrations (Bq/kg, value  ± 1 sigma counting unc.): 
234U 1.71E+09 ± 9.0E+06;  235U 5.94E+07 ± 9.2E+03; 238U 1.63E+06 ± 3.8E+04; 228Th 
1.01E+07 ± 2.0E+05.  
The weight abundance of uranium isotopes in 1 g and percentage: 234U 0.0074 ± 
0.0005 (0.84 %); 235U 0.743 ± 0.003 (84.5 %); 238U  0.129 ± 0.005 (14.7 %). 
18 
234mPa headed by 238U is identified (chain stopped by 234U and 230Th).  235U and 231Th 
(chain stopped by 231Pa). Thorium series detected from 228Th down. Probably headed 
by 232U. 233U is indicated.  It looks like reprocessed uranium.  235/238 atom ratio is 
about 2% if no correction for the attenuation is done. With that the ratio should be 
somewhat higher. Looks like reactor fuel uranium mixed with some other batch 
including 232U that is reprocessed. 
 
2.7.2 Discussion 
As for Scenario 2, the spectrum of Scenario 7 provided the opportunity for deriving a lot of 
information from the material to hand. In general, participants appeared to have no trouble 
identifying the source as some kind of mixture of uranium isotopes with daughters present. In 
relation to the form of the material, the density value provided (being that of UO2) was 
intended to be indicative of the sources form and it was hoped that, in combination with a 
correct identification and perhaps an estimate of activity and some stoichiometry, participants 
would have had enough information to identify the oxide and a number of participants did 
ascertain the correct identity. Discussions with some participants indicated that the software 
routine MGAU had been employed and provided results contrary to what the reporting 
analyst felt were reasonable and subsequently reported. It should be noted that the spectrum 
for Scenario 7 was simulated using a normal coaxial detector such as may be found in any 
laboratory. The MGAU code was originally developed for small volume (hence higher 
resolution) low energy gamma detectors. Such detectors display resolutions of 500 eV in the 
energy range that MGAU employs (80 to 120 keV) and this is significantly better than the 900 
eV or so resolution of the detector for MALRAD. In addition, no attempt was made in the 
simulation to accurately and faithfully reproduce the differences in HPGe peak shapes that 
may occur for low energy gammas (Gaussian)  and x-rays (Voight) or conduct a simulation 
directed at suitability for MGAU type assays. In this context, it could not be assured that the 
MALRAD scenarios would produce accurate results using MGAU (nor, for the same reasons, 
MGA with Scenario 2). The enrichment levels indicated by the participants ranged from 70% 
and upwards which were reasonable and would be sufficient to initiate the correct response. 
One participant produced isotope values of (weight per gram with actual values in 
parentheses) 234U: 0.0074 ± 0.0005 (0.0011),  235U: 0.743 ± 0.003 (0.727) and 238U: 0.129 ± 
0.005 (0.139) which were in good agreement with the actual data. Activities (Bq/kg) quoted 
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by the same participant, even for such a difficult sample were (reported data with actual in 
parentheses): 234U 1.71E+09 ± 9.0E+06 (2.53E+09);  235U 5.94E+07 ± 9.2E+03 (5.82E+07); 
238U 1.63E+06 ± 3.8E+04 (1.67E+06); 228Th 1.01E+07 ± 2.0E+05 (7.87E+06) which were 
good results given the material to hand and the context of the scenario. A number of 
participants also recognized the fact that the uranium was reprocessed uranium as opposed to 
fresh. It was also quite satisfactory to note that some participants were able to elucidate that 
the common (for environmental samples) 208Tl isotope was actually arising from 232U as 
opposed to 232Th. Reliance on “normal” commercial libraries for identifying the source was 
likely to produce erroneous results due to the profusion of peaks and the possible influence of 
such libraries on the analysis is reflected in a number of reported results. In general, it had 
been hoped by the organizers that more participants would have attempted quantitative 
analysis than actually did but it is probable that time constraints played a role in this aspect of 
the exercise. 
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3. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Based on the results obtained from the participants and communications received, it appears 
that most participants have no significant problems in identifying single isotopes in 
uncomplicated situations even from spectra with low resolution. For the case of isotopes in 
the presence of shielding, especially when low energy lines are involved, the situation is a 
little different and the potential for difficulties were well demonstrated for Scenario 1. The 
scenarios that proved most difficult were those involving materials that participants were 
generally not familiar with – in particular Scenarios 2 and 7. While most participants were in 
a position to identify generally what the materials were (in relation to isotopes), there 
appeared to be either a general lack of a clear idea of what sort of information could or should 
be reported for such materials or an inability to derive that information. Such information 
includes the enrichment level and the type of uranium materials and the nature and age of 
plutonium materials. As the gamma spectrometric operations required to derive such 
information (to an accuracy level appropriate for first reponse) are standard, it should 
theoretically be within the grasp of most laboratories to provide such information. While it is 
accepted that international agencies have devoted significant efforts towards establishing 
state-of-the-art facilities and capacities in this area and would ultimately be called upon, a 
responsibility exists on the national level to be able to respond to such situations. At a 
minimum, such a national response should be able to establish whether or not international 
assistance is required and there are some indications that perhaps that is not the case. As an 
example, the interdiction of an amount of natural uranium mineral or even depleted uranium 
may not necessitate international assistance whereas highly enriched uranium probably would 
and it is therefore of some importance that, on a national level, the capacity exists to 
differentiate between such materials.  In this respect it is possible that improvements could be 
gained in the general ability of laboratories to respond to incidents involving special nuclear 
materials both with respect to knowledge as to what information can be derived and how that 
information can be obtained from techniques such as gamma spectrometry.  In relation to the 
Nordic and Baltic states it is possible that the most appropriate means of improving capacities 
in this regard is via approproiate seminars or exercises conducted under the auspices of bodies 
such as the NKS, the CBSS Working Group on Gamma Spectrometry or the NKS 
GammaSem network.  
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 APPENDIX 1 – Spectral information for Scenario 1 
 
Nuclide Energy keV 
HPGe 
Channel 
HPGe 
Counts 
HPGe 
FWHM keV 
NaI 
Channel NaI Counts 
NaI FWHM 
keV 
241Am 59.5 157 96.6 0.9 20 414.5 10.27 
241Am 125.3 365 9.3 0.9 46 20 16.3 
241Am 146.6 432 13 0.9 54 26.9 17.96 
241Am 150 443 2.8 0.9 55 5.8 18.22 
241Am 164.6 489 7 0.9 61 14.3 19.3 
241Am 165.8 493 2.6 0.9 62 5.4 19.39 
241Am 169.6 505 24.3 0.9 63 50 19.66 
241Am 175.1 522 3.3 0.9 65 6.9 20.05 
241Am 192 576 8.1 0.9 72 16.9 21.23 
241Am 208 626 477.1 0.9 78 1025.6 22.31 
241Am 221.5 669 34.7 0.9 84 76.4 23.2 
241Am 232.9 705 4.7 0.9 88 10.6 23.93 
241Am 246.7 749 3.1 0.9 94 7.1 24.8 
241Am 249 756 6.6 0.9 94 15.3 24.95 
241Am 264.9 806 14.6 0.9 101 34.7 25.92 
241Am 267.5 815 42.8 0.9 102 102.4 26.08 
241Am 275.8 841 12 0.9 105 29.2 26.58 
241Am 291.3 890 6.5 0.9 111 16.2 27.49 
241Am 292.8 894 29.3 0.9 112 73.5 27.58 
233Pa 300.3 918 48.2 0.9 115 122.4 28.02 
241Am 304.2 931 2.3 0.91 116 5.9 28.24 
241Am 310.3 950 36.4 0.92 119 92.3 28.59 
233Pa 312.2 956 306.1 0.92 119 776.8 28.7 
241Am 322.5 988 398.7 0.94 124 1012.2 29.29 
241Am 329.7 1011 30.1 0.95 126 76.4 29.69 
241Am 332.4 1020 416.7 0.95 127 1058.2 29.84 
241Am 335.4 1029 1400.9 0.95 129 3557.8 30 
241Am 337.7 1037 12 0.96 130 30.4 30.13 
233Pa 340.8 1046 42 0.96 131 106.6 30.3 
241Am 349.5 1074 3.6 0.97 134 9.3 30.78 
241Am 358.3 1101 3.8 0.99 138 9.6 31.26 
241Am 368.6 1134 716.2 1 142 1822.8 31.81 
241Am 370.9 1142 175.1 1 143 445.6 31.94 
233Pa 375.5 1156 7.4 1.01 144 18.9 32.18 
241Am 376.7 1160 470.2 1.01 145 1197.5 32.24 
241Am 383.8 1182 97.9 1.02 148 249.5 32.62 
241Am 390.6 1204 21.1 1.03 150 53.9 32.98 
233Pa 398.7 1229 16.5 1.04 154 42.2 33.4 
241Am 406.4 1254 5.3 1.05 157 13.5 33.8 
233Pa 415.8 1283 21.9 1.06 160 55.8 34.28 
241Am 419.3 1295 112.5 1.07 162 287.3 34.46 
241Am 426.5 1317 98.4 1.08 165 251.2 34.82 
241Am 429.9 1328 4.5 1.08 166 11.5 35 
241Am 442.8 1369 14.6 1.1 171 37.3 35.65 
241Am 452.6 1400 10.2 1.11 175 26.2 36.13 
241Am 454.7 1406 41.6 1.11 176 106.3 36.23 
241Am 459.7 1422 15.6 1.12 178 39.9 36.48 
241Am 468.1 1449 12.8 1.13 181 32.7 36.9 
241Am 485.9 1505 4.6 1.15 188 11.7 37.76 
241Am 512.5 1589 5.5 1.18 199 14.1 39.03 
241Am 514 1594 12.5 1.18 199 32 39.1 
241Am 522.1 1620 4.4 1.19 202 11.2 39.48 
241Am 573.9 1784 6.3 1.25 223 16.1 41.87 
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241Am 586.6 1824 7 1.26 228 17.9 42.43 
241Am 597.5 1858 40.1 1.27 232 102.2 42.92 
241Am 619 1926 311.2 1.3 241 791.5 43.87 
241Am 627.2 1952 3.1 1.3 244 8 44.23 
241Am 633 1971 7.3 1.31 246 18.7 44.49 
241Am 641.5 1997 39.8 1.32 250 101.1 44.85 
241Am 653 2034 218.8 1.33 254 555 45.35 
241Am 662.4 2064 2091.6 1.34 258 5300.5 45.76 
241Am 669.8 2087 2.2 1.35 261 5.6 46.07 
241Am 676 2107 3.8 1.35 263 9.6 46.34 
241Am 680.1 2119 18.3 1.36 265 46.3 46.51 
241Am 688.8 2147 178.5 1.37 268 451.2 46.88 
241Am 693.6 2162 22.1 1.37 270 55.9 47.08 
241Am 696.6 2172 29.9 1.37 271 75.7 47.21 
241Am 709.5 2212 38.8 1.39 277 97.9 47.75 
241Am 722 2252 1199 1.4 282 3023 48.27 
241Am 729.7 2276 8 1.41 285 20.2 48.59 
241Am 731.5 2282 2.9 1.41 285 7.3 48.66 
241Am 737.3 2300 49.5 1.41 288 124.7 48.9 
241Am 755.9 2359 47.7 1.43 295 120 49.66 
241Am 759.5 2371 10.7 1.44 296 26.9 49.8 
241Am 767 2394 31.6 1.44 299 79.4 50.11 
241Am 770.5 2405 31.7 1.45 301 79.6 50.25 
241Am 772.4 2411 16.9 1.45 301 42.4 50.33 
241Am 789.2 2464 2.5 1.46 308 6.3 51 
241Am 801.9 2505 8.4 1.47 313 21.1 51.51 
241Am 812 2537 3.9 1.48 317 9.8 51.91 
241Am 819.3 2560 2.6 1.49 320 6.6 52.2 
241Am 851.6 2662 2.5 1.52 333 6.3 53.47 
241Am 862.7 2697 3.5 1.53 337 8.8 53.9 
241Am 872.7 2729 4.7 1.54 341 11.8 54.29 
241Am 902.5 2823 2.1 1.56 353 5.1 55.43 
241Am 955.7 2991 4.1 1.61 374 10.1 57.43 
 
Table  A1. Comparison of the characteristics of constituent photopeaks for the simulations of 
scenario 1 for both the NaI and HPGe detectors. 
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Figure A1. Assignation of constituent peaks in the spectrum of Scenario 1. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 – Spectral information for Scenario 2. 
 
Nuclide Channel Energy Counts 
Pu-239 171 51.6 7.8 
Am-241 188 55.6 12.8 
Pu-239 193 56.8 10.3 
Am-241 197 57.9 13.2 
U-237 204 59.5 65.1 
Am-241 204 59.5 209330.5 
Am-241 226 64.8 6.7 
U-237 226 64.8 19.9 
Pu-239 229 65.7 18.2 
Am-241 237 67.5 48.7 
Pu-239 237 67.7 119.6 
Pu-239 242 68.7 293 
Pu-239 242 68.7 108.3 
Am-241 246 69.8 608.6 
Pu-241 254 71.6 12.3 
Pu-239 267 75 164.4 
Pa-233 269 75.3 5.1 
Am-241 271 75.8 91.3 
Pu-241 276 77.1 294.5 
Pu-239 278 77.6 3065.4 
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Pu-239 282 78.4 1173.1 
Th-231 305 84.2 3.3 
Np-237 315 86.5 269.8 
Pa-233 316 86.8 44.4 
Np-237 321 88 3.7 
Pu-239 327 89.4 78.1 
Pu-239 328 89.6 1206.5 
U-235 329 90 6.2 
Np-237 339 92.3 67.2 
U-235 343 93.4 16.2 
Pa-233 348 94.7 577.1 
Pu-240 348 94.7 402 
Pu-241 348 94.7 24515.6 
Pu-239 348 94.7 248664.5 
Pu-238 348 94.7 61.7 
Np-237 349 94.7 32.2 
Np-237 353 95.9 160.4 
Am-241 358 97.1 17181.6 
U-237 358 97.1 72399.9 
Pu-239 364 98.4 543673.8 
Pu-238 364 98.4 140.5 
Pa-233 364 98.4 1316.5 
Pu-241 364 98.4 60907.5 
Pu-240 364 98.4 916.9 
Pu-239 365 98.8 119850.6 
Am-241 366 99 327261.2 
Pu-238 370 99.9 9515.1 
U-237 375 101.1 162020.5 
Am-241 375 101.1 229267 
U-237 383 103 45.8 
Am-241 383 103 431616 
Pu-239 383 103 31648.1 
Pu-242 385 103.5 11.7 
Pu-241 386 103.7 31235.7 
Pa-233 387 104 100.5 
Pu-240 388 104.2 249371.9 
U-235 390 104.8 5 
U-235 394 105.6 9.8 
Np-237 396 106.1 7.2 
Np-237 405 108.4 97.8 
U-235 406 108.6 44.7 
Np-237 406 108.7 10.9 
U-235 407 109 16.8 
U-235 408 109.2 7.9 
Am-241 410 109.7 171.4 
Pu-240 413 110.4 268 
Pu-241 416 111 79946.8 
Pu-239 416 111 528233.7 
Pa-233 417 111.3 769 
Pu-240 417 111.3 537.2 
Pu-238 417 111.3 82 
Np-237 419 111.9 60.9 
Pu-240 420 112 20.6 
Am-241 425 113.3 64970.4 
U-237 428 113.9 139284.8 
Pu-241 428 114 3620.5 
Pu-238 430 114.4 37.9 
Pu-240 430 114.4 248 
Pu-241 430 114.4 15215.2 
Pu-239 430 114.4 148684.5 
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Pu-240 432 114.8 90.5 
Pu-241 432 114.8 5598.1 
Pa-233 432 114.9 464.5 
Pu-239 432 114.9 52664 
Pu-239 434 115.4 138324.9 
Pu-239 437 116.3 187967.8 
Np-237 443 117.7 43.2 
U-237 444 117.9 58288.9 
Am-241 444 117.9 138.3 
Pu-239 452 119.7 8258.7 
Pu-239 452 119.7 3759.5 
U-234 457 120.9 12.9 
Pu-241 458 121.2 592.9 
Pu-239 462 122.4 332.2 
Am-241 465 123 18421.1 
Pu-239 468 123.6 2312.7 
Pu-239 471 124.5 7481.1 
Pu-239 474 125.2 8939.8 
Am-241 475 125.3 81565.2 
Pu-239 491 129.3 942830.5 
Np-237 498 131.1 10.8 
Np-237 512 134.3 9.5 
Pu-239 542 141.7 7441.9 
Np-237 549 143.2 83 
Pu-239 550 143.7 4287.2 
U-235 551 143.8 67.1 
Pu-239 552 144.2 71276.6 
Pu-239 560 146.1 31726.1 
Am-241 562 146.6 20080.1 
Pu-241 570 148.5 111626.8 
Am-241 576 150 3570.6 
Np-237 582 151.4 58.5 
Pu-238 588 152.7 3630.2 
Am-241 594 154.3 27 
Np-237 598 155.2 24.9 
Pu-239 611 158.4 371.3 
Am-241 614 159.3 85.8 
Pu-241 617 160 5372.8 
Pu-239 618 160.2 2406.4 
Pu-240 619 160.3 38335.8 
Pu-239 623 161.5 49198.1 
Am-241 624 161.5 97.1 
Np-237 628 162.5 10.4 
U-235 631 163.4 52.3 
Am-241 636 164.6 4578.9 
U-237 636 164.6 41794.1 
Am-241 641 165.8 1655.8 
Pu-239 650 167.8 1338.8 
Np-237 655 169.2 27.4 
Am-241 657 169.6 13388.8 
Np-237 661 170.6 7.7 
Pu-239 664 171.4 55253.4 
Pu-239 674 173.7 1617.4 
Am-241 680 175.1 1558.8 
Np-237 684 176.1 7.8 
Pu-239 697 179.2 38291.3 
Np-237 703 180.8 10.7 
U-235 710 182.5 5.2 
Pu-239 719 184.6 1341.6 
U-235 723 185.7 919.3 
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Pu-239 733 188.1 7401.4 
Pu-239 738 189.3 57553.7 
Am-241 743 190.4 250.9 
Np-237 747 191.5 14.2 
Am-241 749 192 2524.1 
Np-237 755 193.3 30 
U-235 761 194.9 11.8 
Np-237 761 195 110.2 
Pu-239 764 195.7 82082.2 
Pu-239 769 196.9 2890.8 
Np-237 769 196.9 12.3 
Am-241 770 197 62 
U-235 781 199.6 2 
Np-237 782 200 2.6 
Pu-238 786 201 39 
Am-241 789 201.7 135.1 
Np-237 789 201.7 28 
Np-237 790 202 3.2 
U-235 791 202.1 22.4 
Pu-239 797 203.5 487881.2 
Am-241 799 204.1 404.3 
U-235 804 205.3 108.2 
U-237 815 208 1004261 
Am-241 815 208 115443.5 
Np-237 820 209.2 11.3 
Np-237 833 212.3 116.8 
Pu-240 833 212.5 6728.1 
Np-237 840 214 34.6 
Pu-239 856 218 1222.6 
U-235 870 221.4 3.1 
Am-241 870 221.5 7173.4 
U-237 872 221.8 1175.8 
Pu-239 887 225.4 16649.5 
Np-237 906 230 12 
Am-241 917 232.9 883 
Am-241 924 234.4 136.1 
U-237 924 234.4 1290.8 
Pu-238 925 234.6 2.9 
Pu-239 938 237.8 17912.8 
Th-231 938 237.8 2.8 
Np-237 938 237.9 62 
U-235 950 240.9 2.4 
Pu-239 955 242.1 9443.2 
Am-241 957 242.4 6.3 
Pu-239 961 243.4 33106.9 
Pu-239 967 244.9 6762.4 
Am-241 967 245 6.4 
Am-241 975 246.7 522.3 
Pa-233 982 248.5 63.3 
Pu-239 983 248.9 10290.9 
Np-237 983 248.9 5.2 
Am-241 984 249 1109.5 
Pu-239 1010 255.4 115757.1 
Np-237 1017 257.1 7.4 
Pa-233 1023 258.5 4.5 
Am-241 1033 260.9 244 
Np-237 1039 262.4 8.1 
Pu-239 1045 263.9 40972.8 
Am-241 1049 264.9 2263.7 
Pu-239 1053 265.8 4704 
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Am-241 1060 267.5 6574.4 
U-237 1060 267.5 59048.3 
Am-241 1073 270.6 168.4 
Pa-233 1076 271.5 364.3 
Am-241 1094 275.8 1794.7 
U-235 1109 279.5 11.5 
Np-237 1110 279.6 2.3 
Pu-239 1116 281.1 3664.5 
Pu-239 1133 285.3 3407.9 
Am-241 1158 291.3 930.9 
U-237 1164 292.8 245.4 
Am-241 1164 292.8 4190.5 
Pu-239 1183 297.5 96252.8 
Pa-233 1189 298.9 53.5 
Am-241 1194 300.1 31.7 
Pa-233 1195 300.3 10201.8 
Pu-239 1206 302.9 10167.3 
Am-241 1211 304.2 325.2 
Pu-239 1226 307.8 11272.2 
Am-241 1236 310.3 5034 
Pu-239 1242 311.7 54030.5 
Pa-233 1244 312.2 63527.4 
Pu-239 1261 316.4 28337.3 
Pu-239 1275 319.8 10483.5 
Pu-239 1280 320.9 119024.8 
Am-241 1287 322.5 54370.4 
Pu-239 1292 323.9 120195.5 
Am-241 1316 329.7 4075 
U-237 1327 332.4 145599.5 
Am-241 1327 332.4 56279 
Pu-239 1329 332.8 1149836 
Am-241 1339 335.4 188746.5 
U-237 1339 335.4 11700.5 
Pu-239 1342 336.1 264673.2 
Am-241 1349 337.7 1610.2 
U-237 1349 337.7 1106.9 
Pa-233 1362 340.8 8460.5 
Pu-239 1365 341.5 160271 
Pu-239 1379 345 1367088 
U-235 1381 345.4 4.2 
U-235 1383 345.9 2.3 
Am-241 1397 349.5 485.8 
Pu-239 1416 354 1788 
Am-241 1434 358.3 503.6 
Pu-239 1448 361.8 30819.4 
Pu-239 1470 367.1 239192.3 
U-235 1476 368.5 4.7 
Pu-239 1476 368.5 242117.3 
Am-241 1476 368.6 94746.5 
U-237 1476 368.6 5534.8 
Am-241 1486 370.9 23145.5 
U-237 1486 370.9 15286.2 
Pu-239 1503 375 4300695 
Pa-233 1504 375.5 1474.8 
Am-241 1509 376.7 62035.7 
Pu-239 1524 380.2 859302.8 
Pu-239 1534 382.8 736193.9 
Am-241 1539 383.8 12900.7 
U-235 1556 387.9 2.7 
U-235 1566 390.3 2.9 
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Am-241 1567 390.6 2779.9 
Pu-239 1575 392.6 601740.6 
Pu-239 1577 393.1 1029288 
Pa-233 1600 398.7 3261.1 
Pu-239 1604 399.5 17699.1 
Am-241 1632 406.4 691.2 
Pu-239 1634 406.9 7664.4 
Pu-239 1651 411 21718 
Pu-239 1657 412.4 56.1 
Pu-239 1662 413.7 4562657 
Pa-233 1670 415.8 4299.8 
Am-241 1685 419.3 14711.5 
Pu-239 1698 422.6 380831 
Am-241 1714 426.5 12845.8 
Pu-239 1715 426.6 74069.6 
Am-241 1729 429.9 587.3 
Pu-239 1730 430.2 14030.5 
Am-241 1782 442.8 1899.1 
Pu-239 1794 445.7 29788.1 
Pu-239 1798 446.8 2849.9 
Pu-239 1817 451.5 647715.4 
Am-241 1822 452.6 1331.7 
Am-241 1831 454.7 5407.3 
Pu-239 1843 457.7 5173.7 
Am-241 1851 459.7 2027.6 
Pu-239 1858 461.2 6994.3 
Pu-239 1868 463.7 984 
Am-241 1886 468.1 1659.8 
Pu-239 1911 474.3 322.8 
Pu-239 1941 481.5 16706.7 
Am-241 1959 485.9 592.3 
Pu-239 1964 487 953.1 
Pu-239 1989 493.1 3221.3 
Am-241 2069 512.5 709.2 
Am-241 2075 514 1603 
Am-241 2108 522.1 561.4 
Pu-240 2174 538.1 135.8 
Pu-239 2177 538.9 1182.6 
Pu-239 2225 550.5 1677.1 
Am-241 2322 573.9 791.8 
Am-241 2357 582.6 151.6 
Pu-239 2372 586.1 631.4 
Am-241 2374 586.6 873.8 
Am-241 2418 597.5 4975.7 
Pu-239 2421 598.1 7165.6 
Pu-239 2427 599.6 834.1 
Pu-239 2457 606.9 503.1 
Pu-239 2482 612.8 3998.8 
Pu-239 2499 617.1 5655.5 
Pu-239 2504 618.3 8616.9 
Am-241 2507 619 38215.1 
Pu-239 2508 619.3 5113.3 
Pu-239 2531 624.8 1853 
Am-241 2541 627.2 382.7 
Am-241 2565 633 896 
Pu-239 2565 633.1 10779.3 
Pu-239 2584 637.7 10679 
Pu-239 2593 640 37201.9 
Am-241 2599 641.5 4841 
Pu-240 2603 642.3 13051.8 
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Pu-239 2618 645.9 65206.6 
Pu-239 2632 649.3 3050.4 
Pu-239 2643 652.1 28396.6 
Am-241 2647 653 26421.9 
Pu-239 2655 654.9 9046.7 
Pu-239 2671 658.9 41873.1 
Am-241 2686 662.4 251428.7 
Pu-239 2694 664.5 7182.5 
Am-241 2716 669.8 266.2 
Pu-239 2733 674 1780.8 
Am-241 2742 676 450.7 
Am-241 2758 680.1 2180.8 
Pu-239 2783 686.2 3882.8 
Pu-240 2789 687.6 2789.4 
Am-241 2794 688.8 21162.9 
Pu-239 2802 690.7 3933.7 
Am-241 2814 693.6 2615.4 
Am-241 2826 696.6 3534.8 
Pu-240 2833 698.1 25.7 
Pu-239 2845 701 2245.2 
Pu-239 2856 703.7 17331.5 
Pu-238 2865 706 2.8 
Pu-238 2875 708.3 21.7 
Am-241 2879 709.5 4544.5 
Pu-239 2900 714.6 347.7 
Pu-239 2916 718.2 12333.6 
Am-241 2931 722 139572.6 
Pu-239 2955 727.8 5475.6 
Am-241 2963 729.7 928.9 
Am-241 2970 731.5 334.1 
Am-241 2994 737.3 5715.7 
Pu-238 3017 742.8 277.6 
Am-241 3071 755.9 5451.2 
Pu-239 3072 756.2 12428.8 
Am-241 3085 759.5 1218 
Am-241 3103 763.9 142.1 
Pu-238 3114 766.4 1179.2 
Am-241 3116 767 3589.6 
Pu-239 3125 769.2 22672 
Pu-239 3128 769.9 8005.4 
Am-241 3131 770.5 3591.2 
Am-241 3138 772.4 1910.2 
Am-241 3158 777.2 43.1 
Pu-239 3168 779.5 592.3 
Am-241 3173 780.7 181.3 
Pu-238 3196 786.3 174.6 
Am-241 3208 789.2 280.9 
Pu-239 3222 792.6 89.2 
Am-241 3260 801.9 938.3 
Pu-238 3270 804.4 6.5 
Pu-238 3276 805.8 3.2 
Pu-239 3286 808.2 656.2 
Pu-238 3286 808.2 43.1 
Am-241 3302 812 432.7 
Pu-239 3309 813.9 276.8 
Am-241 3332 819.3 290 
Pu-239 3339 821.1 227.7 
Am-241 3345 822.6 160.2 
Am-241 3369 828.5 173.2 
Pu-239 3371 828.8 616.6 
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Pu-239 3384 831.9 111.7 
Pu-239 3413 839 178.7 
Pu-239 3432 843.8 598.8 
Am-241 3465 851.6 272.8 
Pu-238 3465 851.7 67.4 
Am-241 3477 854.7 142.9 
Am-241 3502 860.7 59.2 
Am-241 3510 862.7 380.9 
Am-241 3551 872.7 506.5 
Pu-240 3557 874.1 607.5 
Pu-239 3577 879 223.3 
Pu-238 3584 880.5 8.6 
Pu-238 3595 883.2 41.4 
Am-241 3612 887.5 160.1 
Pu-239 3627 891.1 343.7 
Am-241 3657 898.4 51.9 
Am-241 3674 902.5 216.2 
Pu-238 3682 904.4 5.4 
Am-241 3715 912.4 181.4 
Am-241 3752 921.5 138.1 
Pu-238 3774 926.7 31.1 
Am-241 3782 928.8 38.8 
Pu-239 3829 940.1 186.8 
Pu-238 3836 941.9 25.2 
Am-241 3852 945.7 40.2 
Am-241 3893 955.7 417.3 
Pu-239 3896 956.4 248.7 
Pu-240 3940 967 52 
Pu-239 3992 979.7 124 
Pu-238 3995 980.4 4.3 
Pu-239 4022 986.9 92.9 
Pu-239 4045 992.6 119.4 
Pu-238 4080 1001 51.9 
Pu-239 4099 1005.6 60.8 
Pu-238 4247 1041.7 11.4 
Pu-239 4311 1057.3 193.6 
 
Table  A2. Constituent photopeaks for the simulation of Scenario 2. 
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Figure A2. Assignation of constituent peaks for the spectrum of Scenario 2. 
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 APPENDIX 3. Spectral information for Scenario 3. 
 
Nuclide HPGe Channel 
Energy 
keV 
HPGe 
Counts 
HPGe 
FWHM 
keV 
CdZnTe 
Channel 
CdZnTe 
Counts 
CdZnTe 
FWHM 
keV 
192Ir x-ray 283 61.5 5877.9 0.9 142 1046.8 3.44 
192Ir x-ray 291 63 12973.6 0.9 146 2214.7 3.48 
192Ir x-ray 303 65.1 22716.9 0.9 152 3678.1 3.54 
192Ir x-ray 312 66.8 48169.4 0.9 156 7508.7 3.59 
192Ir x-ray 337 71.3 11850.4 0.9 169 1699.6 3.71 
192Ir x-ray 350 73.6 3697.4 0.9 175 511.6 3.77 
192Ir x-ray 361 75.6 39679.3 0.9 180 5343.3 3.82 
192Ir x-ray 375 78.1 12335.2 0.9 187 1611.5 3.88 
192Ir 550 110.1 1187.1 0.9 275 119.4 4.6 
192Ir 695 136.3 23818.1 0.9 347 2203.3 5.12 
192Ir 918 177 660.6 0.9 459 56.1 5.84 
192Ir 1052 201.3 73578.4 0.9 526 6063.6 6.22 
192Ir 1076 205.8 511920.3 0.9 538 41851.5 6.29 
192Ir 1125 214.7 234 0.9 563 18.9 6.43 
192Ir 1485 280 312.5 0.9 742 23.7 7.34 
192Ir 1502 283.3 35362.8 0.9 751 2677.1 7.38 
192Ir 1572 296 3770675 0.9 786 283566.9 7.55 
192Ir 1641 308.5 3847282 0.91 820 282440.7 7.7 
192Ir 1676 314.8 5435.4 0.92 838 392.7 7.78 
192Ir 1676 314.8 262.1 0.92 838 18.9 7.78 
192Ir 1685 316.5 10449310 0.93 843 751651.6 7.8 
192Ir 1756 329.3 2275.2 0.95 878 158.7 7.96 
192Ir 2004 374.5 81392 1.01 1002 5140.3 8.49 
192Ir 2229 415.4 551.3 1.06 1114 32.2 8.94 
192Ir 2235 416.5 69903.3 1.06 1117 4071.5 8.95 
192Ir 2257 420.5 7677.9 1.07 1129 443.9 8.99 
192Ir 2518 468.1 4620743 1.13 1259 246248.7 9.49 
192Ir 2565 476.5 318.5 1.14 1282 16.7 9.57 
192Ir 2609 484.6 300142.3 1.15 1305 15577.6 9.65 
192Ir 2613 485.3 207.2 1.15 1307 10.7 9.66 
192Ir 2634 489 41490.3 1.15 1317 2138.3 9.7 
192Ir 3181 588.6 371036.3 1.26 1591 16579.2 10.64 
192Ir 3207 593.4 3481 1.27 1604 154.6 10.68 
192Ir 3268 604.4 664182.8 1.28 1634 29071.2 10.78 
192Ir 3312 612.5 424219.3 1.29 1656 18377.3 10.85 
192Ir 3815 704 384.2 1.38 1908 14.9 11.63 
192Ir 4155 765.8 101.9 1.44 2078 3.7 12.13 
192Ir 4808 884.5 18078.7 1.55 2404 585 13.04 
192Ir 5781 1061.5 2868.8 1.7 2891 80.2 14.28 
 
Table A3. Comparison of CdZnTe and HPGe spectra for the source of Scenario 3 
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Figure A3. Assignation of constituent peaks for the spectrum of Scenario 3. 
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APPENDIX 4. Spectral information for Scenario 4. 
 
Nuclide Energy keV 
HPGe 
Channel 
HPGe 
Counts 
HPGe 
FWHM 
keV 
NaI 
Channel 
NaI 
Counts 
NaI 
FWHM 
keV 
Eu-155 42.3 106 139 0.9 27 1896.2 8.43 
Eu-154 42.3 106 909 0.9 27 12401.7 8.43 
Cm-244 42.8 108 488.6 0.9 27 6256 8.5 
Eu-154 43 109 1784.2 0.9 27 22355.7 8.52 
Eu-155 43 109 272.9 0.9 27 3419.4 8.52 
Eu-155 45.3 116 36.6 0.9 29 356.9 8.8 
Eu-154 48.7 127 911.1 0.9 32 6689.8 9.2 
Eu-155 48.7 127 139.3 0.9 32 1022.5 9.2 
Eu-155 50.2 132 47.1 0.9 33 310.4 9.38 
Eu-154 50.2 132 307.9 0.9 33 2028.9 9.38 
Eu-155 58 158 4.2 0.9 39 19 10.25 
Eu-155 60 165 77.9 0.9 41 326.1 10.47 
Eu-154 82 237 2.1 0.9 59 5.8 12.71 
Eu-155 86.1 250 16.1 0.9 63 43 13.1 
Eu-155 86.5 252 3273.1 0.9 63 8724.3 13.14 
Cm-244 98.9 292 159.2 0.9 73 389.8 14.27 
Eu-155 105.3 314 2556.9 0.9 78 6001.2 14.84 
Eu-154 122.7 371 5.5 0.9 93 11.9 16.31 
Eu-154 123.1 372 32039.8 0.9 93 69122.1 16.35 
Eu-154 129.5 393 11 0.9 98 23.3 16.87 
Eu-154 131.5 400 8.9 0.9 100 18.8 17.04 
Eu-154 134.9 411 5.8 0.9 103 12.1 17.3 
Eu-154 146 448 21 0.9 112 43 18.18 
Eu-155 146.1 448 7 0.9 112 14.4 18.18 
Cm-244 152.6 469 115.8 0.9 117 235.9 18.68 
Eu-154 156.3 481 8.1 0.9 120 16.4 18.96 
Eu-154 165.7 512 2 0.9 128 4.1 19.66 
Eu-154 180.7 562 3.7 0.9 140 7.5 20.75 
Eu-154 184.9 575 3.2 0.9 144 6.7 21.04 
Eu-154 188.3 586 190.2 0.9 147 394.1 21.28 
Eu-154 232.1 731 16.8 0.9 183 37.3 24.23 
Eu-154 237.7 749 4.4 0.9 187 9.8 24.59 
Eu-154 248 783 4687.5 0.9 196 10722.4 25.24 
Cm-244 263.3 833 5.4 0.9 208 12.7 26.2 
Eu-154 267.5 847 17.5 0.9 212 41.5 26.46 
Eu-154 269.8 855 4.5 0.9 214 10.7 26.6 
Eu-154 274 869 2.4 0.9 217 5.9 26.85 
Eu-154 290 921 2 0.9 230 5.1 27.82 
Eu-154 301.2 958 5.8 0.9 240 14.6 28.48 
Eu-154 305.1 971 17.6 0.91 243 44.4 28.71 
Eu-154 312.3 995 10.6 0.92 249 26.6 29.12 
Eu-154 315.4 1005 4.2 0.93 251 10.4 29.3 
Eu-154 322 1027 37.2 0.93 257 93.7 29.68 
Eu-154 329.9 1053 5 0.95 263 12.5 30.13 
Eu-154 346.6 1108 15.2 0.97 277 38.3 31.07 
Co-60 346.9 1109 681.7 0.97 277 1717.9 31.08 
Eu-154 370.8 1187 2.6 1 297 6.6 32.39 
Eu-154 382 1224 4.8 1.02 306 12.1 33 
Eu-154 397.2 1274 14 1.04 318 35.4 33.8 
Eu-154 401.3 1287 96.4 1.04 322 243.9 34.02 
Eu-154 403.5 1295 12.4 1.05 324 31.3 34.14 
Eu-154 414.3 1330 2.2 1.06 333 5.6 34.7 
Eu-154 444.5 1430 238.9 1.1 357 605.1 36.25 
Eu-154 467.8 1506 24.7 1.13 377 62.5 37.42 
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Eu-154 478.3 1541 86.1 1.14 385 218.3 37.93 
Eu-154 488.3 1573 2.8 1.15 390 5 38.2 
Eu-154 506.5 1633 2.4 1.17 408 6.1 39.3 
Eu-154 510.6 1647 22.6 1.18 412 57.3 39.5 
Eu-154 512 1651 12.3 1.18 413 31.1 39.57 
Eu-154 518 1671 17.7 1.19 418 44.8 39.86 
Eu-154 533.1 1721 4.2 1.2 430 10.6 40.57 
Eu-154 546.1 1764 5.1 1.22 441 13 41.18 
Cm-244 554.5 1792 4.1 1.23 448 10.3 41.58 
Eu-154 557.6 1802 89.6 1.23 450 226.8 41.72 
Eu-154 569.2 1840 3.4 1.24 460 8.7 42.26 
Eu-154 582.1 1882 302.7 1.26 471 765.3 42.84 
Eu-154 591.8 1914 1667 1.27 479 4212.3 43.29 
Cm-244 597.4 1932 2.2 1.27 483 5.5 43.54 
Eu-154 598.2 1935 2.1 1.27 484 5.2 43.58 
Eu-154 602.7 1950 12.3 1.28 487 31 43.78 
Eu-154 613.3 1985 3.1 1.29 496 7.7 44.25 
Eu-154 620.6 2009 3 1.3 502 7.5 44.58 
Eu-154 625.3 2024 100.4 1.3 506 253 44.79 
Eu-154 649.6 2104 22.2 1.33 526 55.8 45.86 
Eu-154 651 2109 3.1 1.33 527 7.7 45.92 
Cs-137 661.7 2144 37793.3 1.34 536 94978.8 46.39 
Eu-154 664.7 2154 8.8 1.34 538 22.2 46.52 
Eu-154 669.2 2169 4.1 1.35 542 10.2 46.71 
Eu-154 676.6 2193 47.4 1.35 548 118.9 47.03 
Eu-154 692.5 2245 497.3 1.37 561 1246.5 47.71 
Eu-154 715.8 2322 54.2 1.39 581 135.5 48.71 
Eu-154 723.4 2347 5745.6 1.4 587 14363.3 49.02 
Eu-154 756.8 2457 1252.7 1.43 614 3122.7 50.42 
Eu-154 774.4 2515 2.7 1.45 629 6.7 51.14 
Eu-154 790.2 2567 2.9 1.46 642 7.2 51.78 
Eu-154 800.7 2602 8.5 1.47 650 21 52.21 
Eu-154 815.5 2650 133.3 1.49 663 330.5 52.81 
Cm-244 817.9 2658 2.5 1.49 664 6.2 52.9 
Co-60 826.1 2685 335.7 1.5 671 831.2 53.23 
Eu-154 830.3 2699 2 1.5 675 5 53.4 
Eu-154 845.4 2749 138.1 1.51 687 341.2 54 
Eu-154 850.7 2766 57.3 1.52 691 141.4 54.21 
Eu-154 873.2 2840 3003.4 1.54 710 7398.3 55.09 
Eu-154 880.6 2864 20.9 1.55 716 51.5 55.38 
Eu-154 892.8 2904 124.6 1.56 726 306.2 55.85 
Eu-154 904.1 2942 213.8 1.57 735 524.9 56.29 
Eu-154 906 2948 2.9 1.57 737 7 56.37 
Eu-154 919.2 2991 2.9 1.58 748 7.2 56.88 
Eu-154 924.6 3009 14.6 1.58 752 35.9 57.08 
Eu-154 984.5 3206 2.1 1.63 802 5.1 59.35 
Eu-154 996.3 3245 2337.1 1.64 811 5685.6 59.78 
Eu-154 1004.8 3273 3942.9 1.65 818 9585.4 60.1 
Eu-154 1033.4 3367 2.6 1.67 842 6.3 61.16 
Eu-154 1047.2 3412 10.6 1.68 853 25.6 61.66 
Eu-154 1049.4 3420 3.7 1.69 855 8.9 61.74 
Eu-154 1118.3 3646 20.8 1.74 912 49.9 64.22 
Eu-154 1128.5 3680 63.9 1.75 920 153.2 64.59 
Eu-154 1140.8 3720 46.9 1.76 930 112.3 65.02 
Eu-154 1153.1 3761 2.1 1.77 940 5.1 65.46 
Eu-154 1160.5 3785 8.6 1.77 946 20.5 65.72 
Co-60 1173.2 3827 3340736 1.78 957 7976131 66.16 
Eu-154 1188.6 3877 15.6 1.79 969 37.3 66.7 
Eu-154 1241.4 4051 24.2 1.83 1013 57.5 68.52 
Eu-154 1246.2 4067 160.2 1.84 1017 380 68.68 
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Eu-154 1274.5 4160 6424.2 1.86 1040 15203 69.65 
Eu-154 1290 4211 4.5 1.87 1053 10.6 70.17 
Eu-154 1291.3 4216 2.3 1.87 1054 5.4 70.22 
Eu-154 1316.4 4298 3.2 1.89 1075 7.5 71.06 
Co-60 1332.5 4351 3015330 1.9 1088 7104517 71.6 
Eu-154 1387 4530 3.4 1.94 1133 7.9 73.4 
Eu-154 1408.3 4600 3.9 1.95 1150 9.1 74.1 
Eu-154 1494 4883 111.8 2.01 1221 260.8 76.86 
Eu-154 1537.9 5027 7.7 2.04 1257 17.9 78.25 
Eu-154 1596.6 5220 274.5 2.08 1305 636.3 80.09 
Eu-154 1673.6 5473 2.5 2.13 1368 5.7 82.46 
Co-60 2158.6 7069 22.6 2.42 1767 51.5 96.56 
 
Table A4. Comparison of NaI and HPGe spectra for the source of Scenario 4. (Note that 
escape peaks are not detailed in this list). 
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Figure A4. Assignation of constituent peaks for the spectrum of Scenario 4 (black) and the 
corresponding HPGe spectrum (red). 
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APPENDIX 5. Spectral information for Scenario 5. 
 
Nuclide Energy keV 
Hpge 
Channel 
HPGe 
Counts 
HPGe 
FWHM 
keV 
NaI 
Channel 
NaI 
Counts 
NaI 
FWHM 
keV 
99Mo 40.6 101 371192.6 0.9 25 2866771 8.22
99Mo 89.4 261 7296.6 0.9 65 8655.9 13.41
99mTc 140.5 429 2.53E+08 0.9 107 2.34E+08 17.75
99Mo 140.5 429 2.64E+08 0.9 107 2.44E+08 17.75
99mTc 142.7 436 53319.8 0.9 109 48918.7 17.92
99Mo 158.8 490 56307 0.9 122 49798.1 19.15
99Mo 162.4 501 35254.4 0.9 125 30976.5 19.41
99Mo 181.1 563 17452450 0.9 141 14997570 20.77
99mTc 232.7 733 21.8 0.9 183 18.9 24.27
99Mo 242.3 764 6268.9 0.9 191 5470.2 24.88
99Mo 249.1 787 9625.2 0.9 197 8442.9 25.31
99mTc 322.4 1028 191.2 0.94 257 175.4 29.7
99Mo 366.4 1173 2162337 1 293 1988443 32.16
99Mo 380.1 1218 18325.2 1.02 304 16871 32.9
99Mo 410.3 1317 3211.3 1.06 329 2953.3 34.49
99Mo 411.5 1321 24037.3 1.06 330 22099.1 34.55
99Mo 455.9 1467 2022.6 1.11 367 1838.7 36.82
99Mo 457.6 1473 12233.7 1.11 368 11116.6 36.91
99Mo 469.6 1512 3948.4 1.13 378 3577.5 37.51
99Mo 528.7 1707 76404 1.2 427 68110.4 40.36
99Mo 537.8 1736 4361 1.21 434 3876.7 40.79
99Mo 580.5 1877 3973.4 1.25 469 3486.5 42.77
99Mo 581.3 1880 1240.4 1.26 470 1088.2 42.81
99Mo 620 2007 2715.6 1.3 502 2351.8 44.55
99Mo 621.8 2013 30373.4 1.3 503 26287.2 44.63
99Mo 739.5 2400 12404620 1.42 600 10310030 49.7
99Mo 761.8 2473 399.1 1.44 618 329.3 50.62
99Mo 777.9 2526 4181201 1.45 632 3433069 51.28
99Mo 823 2675 124190.2 1.49 669 100424.9 53.11
99Mo 861.2 2800 6338.2 1.53 700 5056 54.62
99Mo 960.8 3128 84707.2 1.61 782 65380.1 58.45
99Mo 986.4 3212 1085.8 1.64 803 831.4 59.42
99Mo 1001.4 3262 4420.1 1.65 815 3369.9 59.97
99Mo 1017 3313 484.2 1.66 828 367.1 60.55
99Mo 1056.2 3442 748 1.69 861 559.1 61.99
 
Table A5. Comparison of HPGe and NaI spectra for the source of Scenario 5. 
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Figure A5. Assignation of constituent peaks for the spectrum of Scenario 5 (black) and 
associated HPGe spectrum (red). 
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 APPENDIX 6 Spectral information for Scenario 6 
Nuclide Energy keV 
Hpge 
Channel 
HPGe 
Counts 
HPGe 
FWHM 
keV 
CdZnTe 
Channel 
CdZnTe 
Counts 
CdZnTe 
FWHM 
keV 
75Se 66.1 308 2177.8 0.9 77 346 3.57 
75Se 80.9 390 62.4 0.9 97 7.9 3.95 
75Se 96.7 477 60079.8 0.9 119 6631.4 4.32 
75Se 121.1 611 575209.9 0.9 153 55224.7 4.83 
75Se 136 693 2464185 0.9 173 228581.4 5.12 
75Se 198.6 1037 100678.3 0.9 259 8344.9 6.18 
75Se 264.7 1400 4531855 0.9 350 347884.2 7.14 
75Se 279.5 1482 1950445 0.92 370 148303.7 7.33 
75Se 303.9 1616 104579.3 0.96 404 7785.8 7.65 
75Se 373.6 1999 203.4 1.06 500 12.9 8.48 
75Se 400.7 2148 947582.2 1.1 537 56967.2 8.78 
75Se 419.1 2249 978.7 1.12 562 56.9 8.98 
75Se 572.2 3091 3022.5 1.31 773 138.4 10.49 
75Se 617.8 3342 378.6 1.36 835 16.3 10.9 
 
Table A6. Constituent photopeaks for the spectrum of Scenario A6. 
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Figure A6. Assignation of constituent photopeaks for the spectrum of Scenario 6 (black) and 
the corresponding HPGe spectrum (red). 
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 APPENDIX 7 Spectral information for Scenario 7 
 
Channel Energy keV Area Nuclide 
59 31.6 24.5 U-235 
68 34.7 156.1 U-235 
82 39.9 1995 Bi-212 
86 41.4 529.9 U-235 
88 42 1158.7 U-235 
88 42.2 1046.8 Th-231 
89 42.4 3.2 U-233 
90 42.8 1281.1 Th-231 
93 44.1 18.5 Th-231 
97 45.3 1062.4 Th-231 
108 49.4 19009.3 U-236 
108 49.6 92.8 U-238 
113 51.2 1190 U-235 
118 53.2 380278.1 U-234 
121 54.1 2302.2 U-235 
121 54.3 2331 U-235 
122 54.7 2.6 U-233 
131 57.8 20.4 Th-234 
131 57.8 2758.9 U-232 
133 58.6 51741.2 Th-231 
144 62.7 20 Pa-234 
144 62.7 4.8 Pa-234m 
145 62.9 85.8 Th-234 
146 63.3 20161.9 Th-234 
147 63.8 3469.5 Th-231 
149 64.4 1555.6 U-235 
158 67.7 275.4 Th-230 
160 68.5 1107.6 Th-231 
167 70.8 2272.7 Bi-212 
172 72.7 26209.2 U-235 
172 72.8 59958.8 Th-231 
172 72.8 24314.6 Tl-208 
172 72.9 4108.5 Bi-212 
175 73.9 124.1 Th-234 
175 73.9 93.2 Pa-234m 
175 74 308.8 Th-234 
178 74.8 15677.3 U-235 
178 74.8 368045.1 Pb-212 
178 75 44918.6 Tl-208 
183 76.9 1563.4 Bi-212 
184 77.1 680674 Pb-212 
184 77.3 4.5 Pa-231 
190 79.3 2886.8 Bi-212 
195 81.1 5797.6 Ra-224 
195 81.2 299997.2 Th-231 
198 82.1 139058.6 Th-231 
199 82.6 1434.8 Bi-212 
201 83.3 822.3 Th-234 
202 83.8 10622.9 Ra-224 
203 84.2 2470221 Th-231 
204 84.4 62073.3 Th-228 
204 84.5 7668.3 Tl-208 
206 85.1 1096.1 Bi-212 
207 85.4 969.6 Th-228 
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208 85.8 2288 Th-231 
210 86.8 115221.5 Pb-212 
211 87 223.6 Th-234 
212 87.3 5894.3 Tl-208 
212 87.3 224686.1 Pb-212 
213 87.7 69.4 Pa-231 
215 88.5 1757.5 Th-228 
218 89.6 2119 Bi-212 
219 89.9 420974.6 Th-231 
219 90 2689311 U-235 
219 90 2643.3 U-236 
219 90.1 22745.3 Pb-212 
222 90.9 124.6 Pa-231 
225 92.3 201451.7 Th-231 
225 92.3 6882.9 Th-234 
226 92.4 38794.1 Th-234 
227 92.7 1056.1 Bi-212 
227 92.8 38696.1 Th-234 
228 93.1 22074.4 Th-231 
228 93.4 28.3 U-233 
228 93.4 5437955 U-235 
228 93.4 4761.8 U-236 
231 94.2 1740.2 Ra-224 
232 94.7 2089.3 Pa-234m 
232 94.7 760.9 Pa-234 
233 94.9 3378.8 Ra-224 
235 95.9 364932 Th-231 
235 95.9 12140.2 Th-234 
236 96.1 45748.8 U-235 
238 96.8 10.9 Pa-231 
239 97.1 19.5 U-233 
239 97.2 12.4 Pa-234 
240 97.5 1357.7 Ra-224 
240 97.6 12701.7 Th-231 
242 98.4 3701.6 Pa-234m 
242 98.4 1346.6 Pa-234 
245 99.3 69106.4 Th-231 
245 99.4 2853.1 Th-228 
246 99.9 176.5 Pa-234 
249 100.8 3.8 Pa-231 
249 100.9 7 Pa-234 
253 102.3 251746.9 Th-231 
254 102.8 39.3 Pa-231 
255 102.9 223.5 Th-228 
256 103.4 76.1 Th-234 
257 103.8 14.5 Pa-234 
260 104.8 846895.8 U-235 
262 105.6 8.8 U-233 
262 105.6 1589100 U-235 
262 105.8 4719.3 Th-231 
263 106.1 13 Pa-231 
265 106.6 11477.1 Th-231 
265 106.7 2.3 Pa-234 
265 106.9 20361.4 Th-231 
269 108 211.1 Th-234 
270 108.4 111932.2 Th-231 
270 108.4 3613.3 Th-234 
270 108.6 599.9 U-236 
270 108.6 3.5 U-233 
270 108.6 6315304 U-235 
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271 109 2332260 U-235 
271 109 211.9 U-236 
272 109.2 1092333 U-235 
275 110.4 58 Pa-234m 
277 111 640.3 Pa-234 
278 111.3 1135.3 Pa-234m 
278 111.5 1485.4 Th-234 
278 111.5 45846.7 Th-231 
279 111.9 16086.8 Th-231 
282 112.8 70561 U-236 
282 112.8 6011.8 Th-234 
284 113.5 223.9 U-238 
286 114.4 463.2 Pa-234m 
287 114.9 230 Pa-234 
288 115.2 62948.1 Pb-212 
289 115.5 17141.3 U-235 
289 115.6 245.7 Th-231 
293 116.8 5238.2 Th-231 
302 120.4 7131 U-235 
304 120.9 412868.2 U-234 
313 124.1 1288.1 Bi-212 
315 124.9 16965.2 Th-231 
316 125.5 22.6 Pa-234 
326 129.1 3049.3 U-232 
332 131.3 586.1 Pa-234 
333 131.6 6116.8 Th-228 
340 134 8707.1 Th-231 
341 134.6 3.9 Pa-234 
344 135.7 29175.5 Th-231 
347 136.6 4559 U-235 
347 136.7 1599.8 Th-231 
357 140.1 19.1 Pa-234 
357 140.1 14.8 Pa-234m 
358 140.5 289.1 Th-231 
358 140.8 89896.5 U-235 
367 143.8 13 Pa-234 
367 143.8 4708553 U-235 
367 143.9 82.3 Th-230 
367 144 582.9 Bi-212 
370 145.1 2543.1 Th-231 
372 145.9 14217.6 Th-231 
374 146.3 5.3 U-233 
383 149.9 3.2 Pa-234 
386 150.9 36399.9 U-235 
391 152.7 278.6 Pa-234 
410 159.5 33 Pa-234 
420 163.1 87045.8 Th-231 
420 163.4 2861479 U-235 
422 164 383.7 Bi-212 
423 164.5 6.7 U-233 
425 164.9 2.8 Pa-234 
425 165 2238.1 Th-231 
426 165.6 3.9 Pa-234 
429 166.4 8169.8 Th-228 
437 169.6 724.7 Th-231 
441 170.9 28.9 Pa-234 
447 173 25003.2 Th-231 
447 173.3 6269.4 U-235 
450 174.2 11590.8 Th-231 
451 174.6 9.9 Pa-234 
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457 176.7 4553 Pb-212 
465 179.8 2.8 Pa-234 
466 180.2 289.2 Bi-212 
473 182.5 231823.8 U-235 
475 183.5 22600.3 Th-231 
479 184.7 33.7 Pa-234m 
479 184.8 225.2 Th-234 
481 185.7 40054400 U-235 
482 186.1 24.2 Th-230 
483 186.2 116.8 Pa-234 
488 187.9 2.4 U-233 
490 188.8 2291 Th-231 
497 191.4 3.1 U-232 
501 192.9 11.8 Pa-234m 
501 192.9 3.2 Pa-234m 
503 193.7 34.3 Pa-234 
507 194.9 471137.3 U-235 
512 196.8 5.1 Pa-234 
518 198.9 32203.5 U-235 
519 199.6 76999.5 U-235 
520 200 12.5 Pa-234m 
520 200 5.3 Pa-234 
523 201 65.9 Pa-234 
526 202.1 841497.6 U-235 
529 203.1 91 Pa-234 
529 203.2 22.8 Pa-234m 
535 205.3 3955969 U-235 
537 205.9 2098.5 Th-228 
543 208.2 3.3 U-233 
548 209.9 30 Pa-234m 
552 211.4 6989.4 Tl-208 
562 215.3 22075.7 U-235 
564 216 28150.3 Th-228 
568 217.2 4.7 U-233 
570 217.9 32972.1 Th-231 
575 220 11.3 Pa-234 
579 221.2 4 Pa-234 
579 221.4 99855.5 U-235 
580 221.8 5.7 Pa-234 
593 226.5 334.4 Pa-234 
595 227.3 462.5 Pa-234 
599 228.5 2.1 Th-228 
599 228.8 6772.6 U-235 
609 232.2 14.1 Pa-234 
612 233.4 12749.6 Tl-208 
612 233.5 24776.1 U-235 
617 235.1 9.1 Pa-234 
619 236 7892.3 Th-231 
624 237.8 77435.2 Th-231 
626 238.6 5044498 Pb-212 
631 240.2 4.2 Pa-234 
631 240.2 241.8 Th-231 
633 240.9 64817.4 U-235 
633 241 479260.8 Ra-224 
636 242.1 8.8 Pa-231 
637 242.5 727.6 Th-231 
639 243.2 8.6 Pa-231 
640 243.5 12.4 Pa-234m 
645 245.4 5.6 U-233 
645 245.4 61.6 Pa-234 
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646 245.9 2 Pa-231 
649 246.9 46146.1 U-235 
651 247.8 6.1 Pa-234m 
654 248.7 2.2 U-233 
655 249.2 206.2 Pa-234 
656 249.6 680.9 Th-231 
659 250.4 567.8 Th-231 
662 251.5 34977.7 U-235 
665 252.6 29370.7 Tl-208 
668 253.7 38.1 Th-230 
668 253.9 2.9 Th-230 
673 255.8 20.8 Pa-231 
677 257.2 4.2 Pa-234 
680 258.2 1823.8 Pa-234m 
685 260.2 34.9 Pa-231 
703 266.5 5291.4 U-235 
704 267.1 14.2 Pa-234 
706 267.6 1023.3 Th-231 
713 270.3 378.1 U-232 
719 272.3 90.1 Pa-234 
721 273.2 11.1 Pa-231 
724 274.1 26.5 Th-231 
726 275 7.8 Pa-234 
726 275 7.8 Pa-234m 
726 275.1 37086.9 U-235 
732 277.3 12.9 Pa-231 
732 277.4 271024.6 Tl-208 
735 278.3 3.4 Pa-234 
738 279.5 238373.1 U-235 
744 281.4 5297.5 U-235 
748 282.9 4413.6 U-235 
750 283.7 317.1 Pa-231 
762 288.1 36965.6 Bi-212 
766 289.6 6169.3 U-235 
771 291.4 8.5 U-233 
772 291.7 3347.3 U-235 
775 292.7 738 Ra-224 
778 293.8 248.6 Pa-234 
779 294.3 29040.4 U-235 
781 295.1 2854.7 Bi-212 
783 295.9 12 Pa-234 
792 299.1 16 Pa-234m 
795 300.1 457 Pa-231 
795 300.1 389138.8 Pb-212 
799 301.7 4383.6 U-235 
802 302.6 125.9 Pa-231 
802 302.7 407.4 Pa-231 
819 308.7 340.5 Th-231 
822 310.2 5.9 Pa-234 
823 310.5 2.2 Pa-234m 
824 310.7 3487.7 U-235 
825 311 2528.3 Th-231 
830 312.9 18.8 Pa-231 
832 313.5 8.5 Pa-234 
840 316.7 4.5 Pa-234m 
840 316.7 8.5 Pa-234 
841 317.1 867.9 U-235 
842 317.2 12 U-233 
844 317.9 69.4 Th-231 
850 320.2 95.2 Th-231 
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850 320.4 4.2 Pa-234 
851 320.5 4.5 U-233 
869 327.1 6.9 Pa-231 
871 328 16168 Bi-212 
871 328 330 U-232 
877 330.1 253.3 Pa-231 
878 330.4 62.5 Pa-234 
881 331.4 5.8 Pa-234 
883 332.4 48.7 U-232 
899 338.1 27.2 Pa-234m 
900 338.3 4.3 U-232 
905 340.2 3.2 Pa-234 
906 340.7 32.5 Pa-231 
914 343.5 2542.2 U-235 
915 343.8 2.7 Pa-234 
919 345.4 59202.7 U-235 
920 345.9 32127.8 U-235 
937 351.8 58.8 Th-231 
937 351.9 32.5 Pa-234 
944 354.5 17.7 Pa-231 
948 356.1 4180.7 U-235 
951 357.1 30.9 Pa-231 
952 357.5 18.8 Pa-234m 
953 357.9 2.8 Pa-234 
967 362.8 16.1 Pa-234m 
982 368.5 57709.2 U-235 
985 369.5 192.3 Pa-234 
991 371.8 5748.6 U-235 
992 372 94.7 Pa-234 
1000 374.9 8.5 Pa-231 
1011 379.1 3.2 Pa-234 
1012 379.4 8.7 Pa-231 
1029 385.4 3.1 Pa-234 
1035 387.6 21.8 Pa-234m 
1035 387.9 30613 U-235 
1035 387.9 10.7 Pa-234m 
1042 390.3 32121 U-235 
1052 394.1 7 Pa-234 
1062 397.7 2 Pa-234 
1073 401.8 2.7 Pa-234 
1080 404.2 234.7 Ra-224 
1090 407.8 6 Pa-231 
1095 409.8 25.2 Pa-234 
1097 410.3 2349.4 U-235 
1110 415.2 15042.9 Pb-212 
1113 416.1 2.6 Pa-234 
1138 425.3 2.6 Pa-234 
1142 427 32.6 Pa-234 
1142 427 11.3 Pa-231 
1159 433.1 6.7 Pa-234 
1161 433.6 1233.2 Bi-212 
1196 446.6 8 Pa-234 
1201 448.4 745.6 U-235 
1208 450.9 63.6 Pa-234m 
1213 452.8 31080 Bi-212 
1215 453.6 40.1 Pa-234m 
1219 455 803.5 U-234 
1220 455.1 5913.1 U-235 
1224 456.7 14.9 Pa-234m 
1229 458.6 78.6 Pa-234 
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1237 461.5 2.4 Pa-234 
1244 464.2 2.1 Pa-234 
1255 468 14.8 Pa-234 
1255 468.1 47.7 Pa-234m 
1267 472.3 24.7 Pa-234 
1270 473.6 4489.2 Bi-212 
1272 474.2 2.5 Pa-234 
1276 475.8 47 Pa-234m 
1284 478.7 8.4 Pa-234 
1290 481 20.9 Pa-234 
1304 486 1723.6 Tl-208 
1323 492.7 571.5 Bi-212 
1337 498 4.1 Pa-234 
1352 503.5 28.7 U-234 
1361 506.7 84.4 Pa-234 
1363 507.5 30.8 Pa-234m 
1365 508.2 440.5 U-234 
1368 509.2 41.3 Pa-234m 
1372 510.8 756608.2 Tl-208 
1379 513.4 84.3 Pa-234 
1390 517.2 273.2 U-235 
1396 519.6 25.1 Pa-234 
1401 521.4 47.5 Pa-234 
1419 527.9 24.8 Pa-234 
1422 529.1 5.7 Pa-234 
1436 534.1 5.2 Pa-234 
1444 537.2 5.2 Pa-234 
1463 543.8 8.4 Pa-234 
1463 544 67.7 Pa-234m 
1479 549.8 10116.3 Rn-220 
1490 553.7 2.7 Pa-234 
1499 557.3 13.2 Pa-234m 
1501 558 5.7 Pa-234 
1505 559.2 4.4 Pa-234 
1515 562.8 2.2 Pa-234 
1521 565.2 62.7 Pa-234 
1531 568.9 218.2 Pa-234 
1533 569.5 496.7 Pa-234 
1540 572 11.1 Pa-234m 
1551 576 68 Bi-212 
1567 581.8 329.6 U-234 
1570 583.2 2591216 Tl-208 
1573 584.1 10.4 Pa-234 
1579 586.3 4.3 Pa-234 
1583 587.8 1218.1 Tl-208 
1590 590.3 2.1 Pa-234 
1604 595.4 5.5 Pa-234 
1608 596.9 11.5 Pa-234 
1624 602.6 31.5 Pa-234 
1629 604.6 3 Pa-234 
1649 612 21.9 Pa-234 
1663 617 2.9 Pa-234 
1669 619 2.1 Pa-234 
1672 620.4 294.3 Bi-212 
1683 624.2 19.9 Pa-234 
1683 624.4 20.9 U-234 
1687 625.7 2.4 Pa-234m 
1693 628.1 13.6 Pa-234 
1697 629.4 19.8 Pa-234 
1706 632.6 2 Pa-234 
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1710 634.3 7.5 Pa-234 
1741 645.5 429.5 Ra-224 
1744 646.5 6.3 Pa-234 
1747 647.7 26.1 Pa-234m 
1751 649 17 Pa-234m 
1754 650.1 1022.6 Tl-208 
1764 653.7 25.3 Pa-234 
1768 655.2 7.4 Pa-234 
1768 655.3 22.9 Pa-234m 
1774 657.4 21.4 Pa-234 
1780 659.8 14.7 Pa-234 
1792 663.9 29.4 Pa-234 
1799 666.5 63 Pa-234 
1807 669.7 53.6 Pa-234 
1810 670.8 6 Pa-234m 
1819 673.9 10.4 Pa-234m 
1822 675.1 5.4 Pa-234 
1829 677.7 24.7 U-234 
1845 683.4 9.2 Pa-234m 
1846 683.9 8 Pa-234 
1850 685.1 7.5 Pa-234 
1866 691.1 124.7 Pa-234m 
1870 692.6 65.6 Pa-234 
1878 695.5 24.8 Pa-234m 
1888 699 189.2 Pa-234 
1895 701.6 112 Pa-234m 
1905 705.2 589.8 Tl-208 
1907 705.9 63 Pa-234m 
1907 705.9 118.8 Pa-234 
1922 711.5 8 Pa-234 
1928 713.7 7.5 Pa-234 
1951 722 5310.4 Tl-208 
1965 727.3 480913 Bi-212 
1967 727.8 5.8 Pa-234 
1975 730.9 32.1 Pa-234 
1980 732.5 19.8 Pa-234m 
1982 733.4 350.4 Pa-234 
1995 738 58.1 Pa-234 
2000 740 178.2 Pa-234m 
2007 742.5 213 U-235 
2008 742.8 1214.9 Pa-234m 
2008 742.8 103.8 Pa-234 
2016 745.9 16.1 Pa-234 
2022 748.1 5.2 Pa-234 
2024 748.7 1107.1 Tl-208 
2041 755 60.7 Pa-234 
2052 758.9 12.2 Pa-234 
2056 760.3 23.3 Pa-234m 
2058 761 3.6 Pa-234 
2063 763.1 45962.2 Tl-208 
2068 764.8 9.9 Pa-234 
2072 766.4 3.4 Pa-234 
2072 766.4 4365.4 Pa-234m 
2080 769.1 9.1 Pa-234 
2089 772.4 3.5 Pa-234 
2106 778.6 2.2 Pa-234 
2111 780.4 43.7 Pa-234 
2113 781.4 113.9 Pa-234m 
2119 783.4 14.5 Pa-234 
2124 785.4 76225 Bi-212 
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2127 786.3 57.7 Pa-234 
2127 786.3 707 Pa-234m 
2145 792.8 2.1 Pa-234 
2150 794.7 304.3 U-235 
2150 794.9 67.1 Pa-234 
2154 796.1 123.5 Pa-234 
2176 804.4 29.5 Pa-234 
2181 805.9 119.6 Pa-234 
2181 805.9 61.6 Pa-234m 
2187 808.3 42.9 Pa-234m 
2192 809.9 7266.4 Pa-234m 
2196 811.5 5.8 Pa-234 
2203 814.2 14.6 Pa-234 
2214 818.2 14.2 Pa-234m 
2217 819.2 88.1 Pa-234 
2222 821.1 961.6 Tl-208 
2231 824.2 5.8 Pa-234 
2233 825.1 87.7 Pa-234 
2235 825.6 19.7 Pa-234m 
2245 829.3 16.7 Pa-234 
2251 831.5 191.1 Pa-234 
2285 844.1 19.3 Pa-234 
2285 844.1 15 Pa-234m 
2291 846.1 2.3 Pa-234 
2306 851.7 3.3 Pa-234 
2306 851.7 85.3 Pa-234m 
2330 860.6 289037.6 Tl-208 
2338 863.2 3.2 Pa-234 
2347 866.8 14.4 Pa-234m 
2355 869.7 8.8 Pa-234 
2373 876 112.7 Pa-234 
2385 880.5 177.9 Pa-234 
2385 880.5 266.8 Pa-234 
2387 881.1 36.2 Pa-234m 
2392 883.2 15.7 Pa-234m 
2393 883.2 426 Pa-234 
2393 883.2 22.8 Pa-234m 
2393 883.3 706.4 Tl-208 
2404 887.3 94.5 Pa-234m 
2420 893.4 23799.9 Bi-212 
2435 898.7 141.9 Pa-234 
2450 904.4 14.8 Pa-234 
2489 918.4 4.3 Pa-234 
2498 921.7 164.7 Pa-234m 
2507 925 334.5 Pa-234 
2509 925.9 77.1 Pa-234 
2512 926.7 15.9 Pa-234m 
2512 926.7 308.4 Pa-234 
2514 927.4 2885 Tl-208 
2537 935.8 2.8 Pa-234 
2538 936.3 23.1 Pa-234m 
2553 941.9 31.8 Pa-234m 
2564 946 565.2 Pa-234 
2564 946 126 Pa-234m 
2569 947.7 68.2 Pa-234 
2581 952.1 10212 Bi-212 
2583 952.7 3.4 Pa-234 
2603 960 11.3 Pa-234m 
2603 960 3 Pa-234 
2619 965.8 19.5 Pa-234 
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2653 978.2 3.7 Pa-234 
2658 980.3 123.2 Pa-234 
2658 980.3 82.2 Pa-234 
2662 981.6 29.5 Pa-234 
2665 982.7 4282.8 Tl-208 
2669 984.2 66.3 Pa-234 
2683 989.2 4.2 Pa-234 
2690 992 3.3 Pa-234 
2698 994.6 251.9 Pa-234 
2702 996.1 50.2 Pa-234m 
2715 1001 10195.8 Pa-234m 
2740 1009.9 2.6 Pa-234 
2772 1021.8 5.6 Pa-234 
2782 1025.3 2 Pa-234 
2791 1028.7 22.5 Pa-234 
2827 1041.7 14.2 Pa-234m 
2834 1044.4 11.7 Pa-234 
2853 1051.4 2.4 Pa-234 
2875 1059.4 12.7 Pa-234m 
2882 1061.9 26.7 Pa-234m 
2914 1073.6 3.9 Pa-234 
2915 1074.1 865.9 Bi-212 
2928 1078.7 30798 Bi-212 
2940 1083.2 10.2 Pa-234m 
2940 1083.2 19 Pa-234 
2946 1085.4 5.5 Pa-234m 
2970 1093.9 7770.7 Tl-208 
3005 1106.9 3.1 Pa-234 
3015 1110.6 2.3 Pa-234 
3043 1120.6 19 Pa-234m 
3047 1122.1 18.5 Pa-234 
3055 1125.2 13.3 Pa-234 
3057 1125.7 94.8 Tl-208 
3057 1125.7 39 Pa-234m 
3060 1126.8 11.1 Pa-234 
3060 1126.8 5.9 Pa-234m 
3133 1153.6 10.9 Pa-234 
3153 1160.8 204.2 Tl-208 
3182 1171.3 3.2 Pa-234 
3190 1174.2 20.5 Pa-234m 
3220 1185.1 310.6 Tl-208 
3243 1193.7 143.5 Pa-234m 
3243 1193.8 7.4 Pa-234 
3308 1217.3 7.5 Pa-234 
3316 1220.4 9.4 Pa-234m 
3316 1220.4 2.2 Pa-234 
3362 1237.2 54.8 Pa-234m 
3373 1241.2 7.8 Pa-234 
3415 1256.5 20 Pa-234 
3487 1282.8 893.4 Tl-208 
3515 1292.8 15.3 Pa-234 
3535 1300.1 339.8 Bi-212 
3679 1352.9 36.8 Pa-234 
3680 1353 6 Pa-234m 
3684 1354.6 4.2 Pa-234 
3696 1359 4.9 Pa-234 
3757 1381.1 113.4 Tl-208 
3780 1389.6 2.3 Pa-234 
3786 1391.9 32.5 Pa-234m 
3792 1393.9 64.4 Pa-234 
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3801 1397.5 2.6 Pa-234 
3809 1400.3 5.4 Pa-234 
3847 1414 21.4 Pa-234m 
3882 1426.9 5.1 Pa-234 
3905 1435.4 89.2 Pa-234m 
3933 1445.4 9.7 Pa-234 
3953 1452.7 24.2 Pa-234 
3969 1458.5 16.4 Pa-234m 
3970 1458.9 2.8 Pa-234 
4065 1493.6 3 Pa-234 
4085 1501 11.5 Pa-234m 
4111 1510.5 11.4 Pa-234m 
4117 1512.8 12135.2 Bi-212 
4125 1515.6 2.1 Pa-234 
4157 1527.2 20.9 Pa-234m 
4219 1550 10.2 Pa-234m 
4220 1550.1 2.1 Pa-234 
4231 1554.1 69.7 Pa-234m 
4242 1558.3 6.5 Pa-234m 
4276 1570.7 9.4 Pa-234m 
4301 1579.9 2 Pa-234 
4318 1585.9 4.1 Pa-234 
4340 1593.9 22.8 Pa-234m 
4340 1594 8.7 Pa-234 
4361 1601.8 4 Pa-234m 
4412 1620.5 58922.9 Bi-212 
4431 1627.3 2.1 Pa-234 
4461 1638.1 5.6 Pa-234 
4486 1647.5 28 Tl-208 
4541 1667.6 6.7 Pa-234m 
4544 1668.4 20.5 Pa-234 
4574 1679.5 2 Pa-234 
4575 1679.7 2224.9 Bi-212 
4591 1685.7 8.3 Pa-234 
4613 1693.8 18.4 Pa-234 
4614 1694.1 3.6 Pa-234m 
4617 1695 7.2 Pa-234 
4632 1700.5 2.7 Pa-234 
4686 1720.5 2.5 Pa-234m 
4706 1727.8 52.3 Pa-234 
4718 1732.2 14.2 Pa-234m 
4734 1737.8 165.9 Pa-234m 
4751 1744 26.7 Tl-208 
4794 1759.8 10.9 Pa-234m 
4810 1765.4 67.3 Pa-234m 
4894 1796.2 2.4 Pa-234m 
4896 1797.1 6 Pa-234 
4921 1806 3244.4 Bi-212 
4929 1809 28 Pa-234m 
4958 1819.7 6.8 Pa-234m 
4991 1831.5 129.2 Pa-234m 
5077 1863.1 8.9 Pa-234m 
5090 1867.7 67.8 Pa-234m 
5110 1875.2 60.2 Pa-234m 
5151 1890.1 3.5 Pa-234 
5160 1893.5 15.9 Pa-234m 
5169 1896.7 2.5 Pa-234 
5209 1911.2 45.4 Pa-234m 
5248 1925.4 7.1 Pa-234 
5251 1926.4 2.2 Pa-234m 
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5280 1937 20.7 Pa-234m 
5370 1970 3.9 Pa-234m 
7136 2614.5 910710.4 Tl-208 
 
Table A7. Constituent photopeaks for the spectrum of Scenario 7. (Note that escape peaks are 
not included in the list). 
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Figure A7. Assignation of constituent photoepeaks for the spectrum of Scenario 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111
 
 
APPENDIX 8 – Documents provided to participants 
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Context Material Provided to Participants for each Scenario. 
 
 
Scenario 1. 
Police  receive  warning  of  a  bomb  placed  in  a  city  centre  location  and  due  to  
previous intelligence  regarding  attempts  by  the  relevant  grouping  to  obtain  radioactive  
materials, request assistance with  respect  to a suspicious vehicle  found near an embassy. A 
collimated standard 3x3 inch NaI detector was mounted on a remotely controlled vehicle and 
positioned at the side of the suspect vehicle which had not been opened. The vehicle, a small 
lorry, was two  meters  wide  and  the  detector  was  placed  at  and  up  against  the  side  of  
the  cargo compartment (the distance between the detector and the side of the truck is 0 cm). 
A spectrum was  accrued  over  a  period  of  ten minutes. Two  dose measurements were 
made,  one  at  the same position at which  the  spectrum was  taken and  the  second at a point 
one meter  further back along the same axis. The background dose in the area was 0.11 
µSv/hr. The dose rate at position one (side of  the  truck) was 0.5 µSv/hr and at position 2 (1 
m away from  the side of the  truck)   was 0.21 µSv/hr. A spectrum for a point source of 
241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 60Co and 88Y had earlier been taken at a distance of 10 cm from the 
detector face and is provided.  
  
Note: a background spectral contribution has been added.  
  
Materials provided:  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_1_source(range of formats)    -  the spectrum accrued from the side of the truck.  
Scenario_1_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
 
Scenario 2. 
Customs officials  stop  a  car  at  a border  crossing driven by a man known  to be  involved  
in international  smuggling  and  criminal  activities.  A  search  of  the  car  is  made  and  a  
steel cylinder is found hidden in the car. The accompanying materials suggest that the 
cylinder may contain radioactive materials and the cylinder is taken away for analysis. The 
cylinder is some 4 cm in diameter and 5 cm in height and is welded shut such that it cannot be 
opened.  It was measured on a standard HPGe detector of some 50% relative efficiency with 
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resolution of 1.9 keV at 1332 keV by being suspended centrally some 15 cm above the 
detector face and measured.   
  
A point source of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 60Co and 88Y had earlier been taken at a distance of 10 
cm from the detector face.  
  
Materials provided:  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_2_source.(range of formats)    -  the spectrum obtained from the cylinder.  
Scenario_2_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
 
Scenario 3. 
A scientist from a  large medical research facility  is admitted  to hospital suffering from what  
appears  to be radiation sickness. The relevant authorities are alerted and upon discovery  that  
the scientist does not work with radioactive materials, a search  is  initiated of  the facility,  its  
grounds and his home by  search  teams equipped with dose meters and a  range of detectors.  
One  team  registers  anomalous  dose  readings  in  the  vicinity  of  what  turns  out  to  be  
the scientist’s car and a spectrum is taken using a small CdZnTe (3 cc) detector from the 
hospitals medical  physics  department.  A  point  source  of  241Am, 137Cs  and 60Co  was  
measured  to establish  the  energy  calibration.  A  dose meter  was  also  used  to  establish  
the  direction  of maximum dose and two measurements were taken: the first of these was 1.8 
m from the side of  the car where  the dose was 229 µSv/hr and one 2 m  further back where  
the dose was 57 µSv/hr.  
  
Materials provided:  
  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_3_source.(range of formats)    -  the spectrum obtained from outside the car with the  
CdZnTe detector.  
Scenario_3_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
 
Scenario 4. 
A  newspaper  receives  a warning  from  a  known  extremist  environmental  group  that  
public rooms of some government buildings have been contaminated with radioactive 
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materials in a radical  act  of  protest  at  an  upcoming  governmental  vote  on  nuclear  
power. The warning  is viewed as credible by the authorities in light of reports of suspicious 
activities at a number of nuclear facilities in a neighbouring country in the preceding months. 
The relevant authorities are  dispatched  to  search  for  contamination  and  cleaners  report  
having  observed  a  black powder  in  the  carpet  of  one  of  the  public  seminar  rooms.    A  
3  x  3  inch  NaI  detector  is employed  to make measurements  and  this  was mounted  
vertically  some  50  cm  above  the surface  of  the  carpet  in  question. A  point  source  of 
241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 88Y  and 60Co was measured  to  establish  the  energy  calibration. The 
measured background  corrected dose  rate was of the order of 20 to 25 µSv/hr above the 
carpet.  
 
Materials provided:  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_4_source.(range of formats)    -  the spectrum obtained from above the carpet.  
Scenario_4_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
 
Scenario 5. 
Passengers on a city centre bus report a suspicious dripping package under a seat and report it  
to  the driver who upon closer  inspection notices what appears  to be plastic pieces and some  
kind of white powder in a plastic bag. One of the pieces seems to have a trefoil symbol on it  
and  as  a  result  of  this,  the  driver  notifies  the  police who  subsequently  notify  the  
relevant authorities  that a  radioactive source may be present on  the bus. The authorities 
arrive and a short spectrum was  taken using a 2 x 2 portable NaI detector at a distance of 1 m  
from  the source. A dose rate measurement was made at 1 m distance and this was 131 
µSv/hr.  A point source spectrum of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs, 88Y and 60Co was taken at a distance 
of 10 cm from the detector face.   
  
Note: a background contribution has been added.  
  
Materials provided:  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_5_source.(range of formats)    -  the spectrum from the source on the bus.   
Scenario_5_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
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Scenario 6. 
Two people are  found dead and autopsy  reveals  that  the most probable cause of death was 
exposure  to a  radioactive source of considerable strength. Searches of  the homes of both by 
the  authorities  reveal  nothing  until  elevated  readings  are  located  in  the  yard  of  one  of  
the homes. The radiation appears to emanate from a pile of junk metal but dose rates are such 
that the  pile  cannot  be  disturbed without  investigation. A  spectrum was  taken  at  a  
distance  of approximately  5  m  from  the  pile  surface  using  a  small  CdZnTe  detector.  
Two  dose measurements were made: one at the same point as the spectrum was taken which 
was 0.802 mSv/hr  and  one  5  m  back  which  was  0.201  mSv/hr  both  having  been  
corrected  for background.  A point source of 241Am, 109Cd, 137Cs and 60Co was measured 
earlier to check the detector.  
  
Note: background spectrum not added.  
  
Materials provided:  
Two spectra, in a number of formats are provided.  
Scenario_6_source.(range of formats)    -  the spectrum obtained 5m from the pile.  
Scenario_6_point.(range of formats)    -  spectrum of the point source taken earlier. 
 
Scenario 7. 
During  a  police  raid  on  a  suspected  radical  group,  a  number  of  materials  are  seized  
and declarations  by  suspects  and  the  context  of  the  find  indicate  the  potential  for  
some  of  the materials being radioactive. A 10 g aliquot of a fine brown powder is presented 
to the relevant authorities for analysis with the request that as much information as possible 
be obtained as to the material. The unknown material was  counted on  a  standard  coaxial 
HPGe detector  in  a plastic cylindrical geometry at a distance of 10 cm. The apparent density 
of the material was 10.95 +/- 0.1. In order to calibrate the detector, an aqueous solution of the 
following nuclides was presented to the detector in the same geometry and at the same 
distance as was to be used for the unknown. 241Am – 30000 Bq, 57Co – 10000 Bq, 60Co – 
10000 Bq, 54Mn – 10000 Bq, 65Zn – 10000, 88Y – 10000 Bq, 137Cs – 10000 Bq and 109Cd – 
10000 Bq and counted  in  the same configuration (ie. 10 cm above the detector).   
  
 Note: background has not been simulated. Activities of the calibration solution are those at 
the time of counting of the spectrum.   
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Materials provided:  
Two spectra in a number of formats are provided  
Scenario_7_calibration.(range of formats)  - the spectrum from the calibration solution  
Scenario_7_source.(range of formats) – the spectrum from the unknown material. 
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